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Abstract
This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conﬂict resolution in inter-
national relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and
mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conﬂict, in a simple game where con-
ﬂict is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated communication helps reducing
the chance of conﬂict as it allows conﬂicting parties to reveal their types and estab-
lish type-dependent transfers to avoid conﬂict. Mediation improves upon unmediated
communication when the intensity of conﬂict is high, or when asymmetric information
is large. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely
reporting information to conﬂicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player
with probability one that the opponent is weak. Surprisingly, in our set up, arbitra-
tors who can enforce settlements are no more eﬀective in reducing the probability of
conﬂict than mediators who can only make non-binding recommendations.
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1 Introduction
The positive analysis of conﬂict and its potential sources has attracted the attention of
game theorists for decades, in an increasingly fertile interaction with international relations
scholars.1 Yet the normative analysis about which institutions or mechanisms we should
use to reduce the possibility of conﬂict has not beneﬁted from many interactions across
the two disciplines so far. In particular, the powerful tools of mechanism design developed
in economic theory have not yet been extensively applied to conﬂict resolution or to the
minimization of the probability of future wars.2 The literature on optimal auctions, opti-
mal market design, organization theory and public good provision mechanisms have been
very successful. Studying optimal mechanisms we can learn important lessons about what
institution designers should consider most eﬀective in diﬀerent situations, and this seems
eminently relevant if we want to think of ﬂexible institutions to help for the reduction or
elimination of costly conﬂicts. Our interest lies more particularly with mediation. This
institution, under the conditions set up in this paper, is by construction one of the optimal
mechanisms. Further, mediation has played an increasingly important role in international
crisis resolution. According to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the most
comprehensive empirical eﬀort to date, 30% of international crises for the entire period
1918–2001 were mediated, and the fraction rises to 46% for the period 1990–2001 (see
Wilkenfeld et al., 2005).
In this paper, we select one of the most studied sources of conﬂict, namely the pres-
ence of asymmetric information, and we examine what institutional mechanisms are most
eﬀective in minimizing the probability of war.3 In particular, when the source of potential
conﬂicts is information asymmetries, it is natural to assume that agents could beneﬁt by
communicating. So, we ﬁrst investigate when and how unmediated cheap talk between the
disputants can reduce the ex ante probability of war, relative to the benchmark without
communication.4 We then turn to the main topic of this paper, mediation: When, and
how, is it the case that communication through a mediator can strictly improve the ex ante
probability of peace with respect to unmediated communication?5 We conclude by evalu-
ating the beneﬁts of enforcement power in mediation. That is, we ask: How do arbitration
and mediation diﬀer in their capabilities of prevent conﬂict?
We assume that the mediator has no private information and is unbiased.6 Further,
1See Jackson and Morelli (2009) for an updated survey of such a positive analysis.
2As examples of the discussion in international relations on the importance of institutional design for
conﬂict or international cooperation, see e.g. Koremenos et al (2001). For a discussion on the lacking
applications of mechanism design to conﬂict, see e.g. Fey and Ramsay (2009).
3Blainey (1988) famously argued that wars begin when states disagree about their relative power and end
when they agree again (see also, Brito and Intriligator, 1985, and Fearon, 1995). Wars may arise because
of asymmetric information about military strength, but also about the value of outside options or about
the contestants’ political resolve, i.e. about the capability of the leaders and the peoples of sustaining war.
For example, it is known that Saddam Hussein grossly under-estimated the US administration political
resolve, when invading Kuwait in 1990.
4On the great relevance of allowing for pre-play communication in situations where bargaining break-
down is due to asymmetric information, see e.g. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004).
5Our notion of communication equilibrium, with and without a mediator, is related to the concepts
introduced in the seminal contributions by Forges (1985) and Myerson (1986).
6As some scholars claim, “mediator impartiality is crucial for disputants’ conﬁdence in the mediator,
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the mediator is assumed fully committed to minimize the probability of war. Hence, our
mediator must be willing to commit to deadlines and to break oﬀ talks when they come to
a standstill, instead of seeking an agreement in all circumstances (see Watkins, 1998). Such
commitments, in fact, facilitate information disclosure by the contestants, and ultimately
improve the chances of peaceful conﬂict resolution.7 Finally, we study mediators who
have no independent budget for transfers or subsidies, and cannot impose peace to the
contestants. To be sure, third-party states that mediate conﬂict, such as the United States,
are neither unbiased nor powerless, but single states account for less than a third of the
mediators in mediated conﬂicts (Wilkenfeld, 2005), so that we view our assumption not only
as a useful theoretical benchmark, but also as a reasonable approximation for numerous
instances of mediated crises.
Unlike most of the mechanism design literature, the ﬁrst part of the paper requires that
the mediator’s proposals be self-enforcing.8 Indeed, countries are sovereign, and enforce-
ment of contracts or agreements is often impossible.9 In the terminology of Fisher (1995),
our main focus is on “pure mediation,” that is, on mediation only involving information
gathering and settlement proposal making, rather than “power mediation,” which instead
also involves mediator’s power to reward, punish or enforce. The assumption that the me-
diator’s proposals are self-enforcing is formalized by requiring that, whenever a mediator
recommends a peaceful settlement of the crisis, both parties must ﬁnd the proposed set-
tlement better for them than starting conﬂict (with its expected associated payoﬀ lottery
and costs) given what they learn from the mediator’s recommendation itself. Since war
can be started unilaterally, this ex post individual rationality constraint is indispensable.
But in order to describe the diﬀerence between arbitration and mediation, in the ﬁnal sec-
tion, we relax ex-post individual rationality and introduce standard ex-interim individual
rationality constraints.
To achieve her objective, the mediators studied in this paper can facilitate communi-
cation, formulate proposals, and manipulate the information transmitted (see Touval and
Zartman, 1985, for a discussion of these three roles; and Wall and Lynn, 1993, for an
exhaustive discussion of all observed mediation techniques). Because we consider unmedi-
ated cheap talk as a benchmark, our mediators can only improve the chances of peace by
controlling the ﬂow of information between the parties.10 In practice, this corresponds to
which, in turn, is a necessary condition for his gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation
success to come about” (see e.g. Young, 1967, and the scholars mentioned in Kleiboer, 1996). On the other
hand, when a mediator possesses independent information that needs to be credibly transmitted, some
degree of bias may be optimal (see Kydd, 2003, and Rauchos, 2006).
7In the ﬁnal discussion, we provide some anedoctal evidence supporting our assumption of full mediator’s
commitment, which is obviously also one of our normative prescriptions.
8Among the few papers studying self-enforcing mechanisms in mechanism design, see Matthews and
Postlewaite (1989), Banks and Calvert (1992), Cramton and Palfrey (1995), Forges (1999), Compte and
Jehiel (2008), and Goltsman et al. (2009).
9Viewed another way, countries cannot commit not to initiate war if such an attack is a proﬁtable devia-
tion from an agreement. In this sense, even if the bargaining problem comes from asymmetric information,
we also have a natural form of commitment problem built in. See Powell (2006) for a recent comprehensive
discussion of the relative importance of asymmetric information and commitment problems in creating
bargaining breakdown.
10In the real world, mediators also often prevent conﬂict by facilitating communication or coordinating
discussions among parties unwilling to communicate without a mediator. Such instances of mediation
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the mediator’s role in “collecting and judiciously communicating select conﬁdential mate-
rial” (Raiﬀa, 1982, 108–109). Obviously, the role for mediation that we identify cannot
be performed by holding joint, face-to-face sessions with both parties, but requires private
and separate caucuses, a practice that is often followed by mediators. In international
relations, the practice of shuttle diplomacy has become popular since Henry Kissinger’s ef-
forts in the Middle East in the early 1970s and the Camp David negotiations mediated by
Jimmy Carter, in which a third party conveys information back and forth between parties,
providing suggestions for moving the conﬂict toward resolution (see, for example, Kydd,
2006).
Having clariﬁed our methodological choices and our general motivation, let us now
describe the basic features of our model and then oﬀer a preview of our ﬁndings.
We consider the canonical conﬂict situation, in which two agents ﬁght for a ﬁxed amount
of contestable resources. The exogenous cake to be either divided peacefully or contested
in a costly conﬂict is a standard metaphor for many types of wars, for example related to
territorial disputes or to the present and future sharing of the rents from the extraction
of natural resources. Indeed, Bercovitch et al (1991) show that mediation is useful mostly
when the disputes are about resources, territory, or in any case divisible issues. Custody,
partnership dissolution, labor management struggles, and all kinds of litigations and legal
disputes could be considered equally relevant applications of the model, but we keep the
international conﬂict example as the main one in the text.
A player cannot observe the opponent’s strength, resolve, or outside options. In partic-
ular, we assume that each player is strong (hawk) with some probability and weak (dove)
with complementary probability. If the two players happen to be of the same type, war is
a fair lottery. When they are not of equal strength, the stronger wins with higher prob-
ability. To complete this standard setting, we assume that all war lotteries are equally
costly.11 War takes place in our game of conﬂict unless both players opt for peace, i.e.
war can be initiated unilaterally, and we assume that the players war declaration choice
is simultaneous. The equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante chances of peace serves as a
benchmark to assess the value of communication and mediation.
This simple setting has been the work-horse for models of war due to imperfect infor-
mation, and it is also the setting common to the very few papers in the literature with
an explicit mechanism design agenda. Speciﬁcally, Bester and Wa¨rneryd (2006) study the
case in which the mediator can enforce settlements, after collecting players’ reports. Like
us, Fey and Ramsay (2009) consider self-enforcing mechanisms. Unlike us, they do not
characterize the optimal self-enforcing mechanism. They show that war can be avoided
altogether in the optimal mechanism if and only if the type distribution is independent
across players and the players’ payoﬀs depend only on their types, unlike in our game.
We ﬁrst study unmediated communication, and then determine when and how media-
tion improves upon it. Following Aumann and Hart (2003), communication enables players
to stochastically coordinate their play, and this role can be summarized by a public ran-
correspond to what we formally call unmediated communication. Our paper conﬁrms the value of mediators
as communication facilitators, by showing that communication often reduces the chance of conﬂict.
11It might be interesting to allow for diﬀerent costs for symmetric and asymmetric wars, but the addi-
tional notational and computational costs appear a heavy price to pay.
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domization device. Furthermore, communication enables the players to signal their private
information, if they wish. Speciﬁcally, we study the following communication protocol.
First, players send a cheap-talk message to each other; second, for any pair of observed
messages, they coordinate either on war or on a peaceful cake division, depending on the
realization of a public randomization device. In equilibrium, it must be the case that play-
ers do not want to unilaterally declare war whenever they are supposed to coordinate on a
peaceful cake division. When war cannot be avoided in the basic conﬂict game, the optimal
separating communication equilibrium is shown to improve on no-communication. Speciﬁ-
cally, it allows players to reveal their type, and establish type-dependent cake divisions to
avoid conﬂict. However, war cannot be fully avoided.12
We then consider mediated communication. First, the mediator collects the players’
messages privately. Then, she chooses message-dependent cake-division proposals, and
correlates the players’ war declaration choices optimally. Peace recommendations must be
ex post individually rational. It is clear that the mediator’s optimal solution cannot be
worse than the best equilibrium without the mediator. In fact, the mediator could always,
trivially, make the messages she receives public, thereby mimicking the optimal unmediated
communication equilibrium. Thus, the usefulness of mediation can be measured by looking
at what regions of the parameters allow the mediator to induce a strict welfare improvement.
Having concluded the informal description of our model, we can describe our main
results as follows.13
- When does a mediator help? A mediator helps in two distinct sets of circumstances.
First, when the intensity (or cost) of conﬂict is high. Second, when the intensity
of conﬂict is low, but the uncertainty regarding the disputants’ strength is high.
Interestingly, the intensity of conﬂict and asymmetric information are considered
among the most important variables that aﬀect when mediation is most successful
(see e.g. Bercovitch and Houston, 2000, and Bercovitch et al., 1991). Our ﬁndings
resonate with well-documented stylized facts in the empirical literature on negotiation
(Bercovich and Jackson 2001, Wall and Lynn, 1993), that show that parties are less
likely to reach an agreement without a mediator when the intensity of conﬂict is high
than when it is low. Rauchhaus (2006) provides quantitative analysis showing that
mediation is especially eﬀective when it targets asymmetric information.
- How does the mediator help? In terms of mediator strategy or tactic, the model al-
lows us to focus only on communication facilitation, settlement proposal formulation,
separation of players, manipulation of their messages or obfuscation of parties’ posi-
tions. In the ﬁrst case in which she is eﬀective, i.e. when conﬂict intensity is high,
12In a small parameter region, in which the cost of war is high, the players can improve on the sep-
arating equilibrium, by playing a mixed strategy equilibrium in the cheap talk game. Of course, mixed
strategy equilibria are strictly dominated by mediation, as mixed strategies induce randomizations inde-
pendent across players, instead of the optimally correlated randomizations chosen by the mediator (see,
e.g. Aumann, 1974).
13The model by Banks and Calvert (1992) can be related to our construction. They also compare the
solution of self-enforcing mediation, to what can be achieved without a mediator in an underlying two-
by-two game. But their underlying game is very diﬀerent from our game of conﬂict: They consider a
coordination game with incomplete information. This makes their results diﬃcult to relate to our results
on mediation and conﬂict.
5
the mediator can improve upon unmediated communication by oﬀering unequal splits
even when she observes both players reporting to be doves. This is equivalent to an
obfuscation strategy by which the mediator does not reveal with probability one to
a self-declared dove that she is facing a dove. With this strategy, the mediator re-
duces the incentive for hawks to hide strength and then wage war if revealed that
the opponent is weak. In the second case, when the intensity is low but uncertainty
is high, the mediator’s strategy involves proposing equal split settlements even when
she receives diﬀerent messages. Equivalently, the mediator does not always reveal
to a self-declared hawk that she is facing a dove, and hence reduces the incentives
for doves to exaggerate strength in order to achieve a favorable settlement when it is
revealed that the opponent is weak. In both cases, the mediator’s proposed settle-
ments do not precisely reveal each player’s report to her counterpart. Although it
is widely believed that a successful mediator should establish credible reports to the
conﬂicting parties, we ﬁnd that a mediator that reports precisely all the information
transmitted would not act optimally. Speciﬁcally (and realistically), the mediator’s
optimal obfuscation strategy consists in not revealing with probability one that the
opponent is weak, when this is the case.
- Does enforcement power help? We ﬁnally conclude the analysis by showing that an
arbitrator who can enforce outcomes, is exactly as eﬀective in preventing conﬂict as a
mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements. In general, the ex-interim
individual rationality constraints that represent each contestant’s free participation
to arbitration are weaker than the ex-post individual rationality constraints that rep-
resent self-enforcing recommendation in mediation. However, in our game of conﬂict,
these sets of constraints turn out to induce the same optimal probability of peace.
This result stands in stark contrast with well-known results in other environments
(see, e.g., Cramton and Palfrey, 1995, Compte and Jehiel, 2008, or Goltsman et al.,
2009). Our results conﬁrms the view that a mediator does not necessarily need en-
forcement power: “A mediated settlement that arises as a consequence of the use
of leverage may not last very long because the agreement is based on compliance
with the mediator and not on internalization of the agreement-changed attitudes and
perceptions” (Kelman, 1958).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our basic model of conﬂict;
section 3 studies unmediated communication; section 4 characterizes optimal mediation,
and displays the most important substantive results, in terms of when and how media-
tion strictly improves upon unmediated communication; section 5 compares mediation and
arbitration, to establish the value of enforcement powers. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some
concluding comments, in particular, it discusses interim mechanism selection, mediator’s
commitment and contestants’ renegotiation. All proofs are in appendices.
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2 The Game of Conﬂict
Let us consider a standard bilateral conﬂict problem, in which two parties want as much
as possible of a given cake.14 As is standard, we normalize the value of such an exogenous
cake to 1. If the two parties cannot agree to any peaceful sharing and choose conﬂict, we
assume that the destructive war would shrink the actual net value of the cake to θ < 1.
War is modeled as a costly lottery, without the possibility of stalemate.15 The prob-
ability of winning for each player depends on players’ types: each player can be of type
H or L, privately and independently drawn from the same distribution with probability
q and (1 − q) respectively. Such a private information characteristic can be thought of as
related for example to resolve, military strength, leaders’ stubbornness, outside options,
etc. When the two ﬁghting players are of the same type we assume that they have the
same probability of winning, whereas when one player is stronger than the other one, she
wins with probability p > 1/2. Hence a type H player who ﬁghts against an L type expects
pθ from such a conﬂict. In the paper we will often refer to type H as a “hawk” and to a L
type as a “dove” (with no reference to the hawk-dove game).16
War can be initiated unilaterally, while “it takes two to tango,” i.e., a peaceful agreement
must be preferred by both players to war in order to work. More precisely, we can think
that for any proposed split (x, 1 − x), (x ∈ [0, 1]), there is a “war declaration game.” In
such a game, the two players simultaneously announce “peace” or “war,” and if they both
announce peace the settlement is accepted otherwise war takes place. We assume that
when the two players choose to accept a peaceful split there are ways to implement such
a split.17 We note that there always exists an equilibrium where both players declare war
in this game, regardless of the split. In what follows, we focus on the equilibrium that
maximizes the ex ante probability of peace, which will be denoted by V .
If pθ < 1/2, conﬂict can always be averted with the anonymous split (1/2, 1/2); we shall
therefore assume henceforth that pθ > 1/2.
The model has three parameters: θ, p, and q. Yet all results depend on only two
statistics:18
λ ≡ q
1− q and γ ≡
pθ − 1/2
1/2− θ/2 .
λ is the hawk/dove odds ratio, and γ represents the ratio of beneﬁts over cost of war for
a hawk: the numerator is the gain for waging war against a dove instead of accepting the
14Depending on the context, of course, the interpretation of what the cake means ranges from territory
or exploitation of natural resources to any measure of social surplus in a country or partnership.
15Allowing for the possibility of stalemate makes the problem inherently dynamic. A dynamic extension
of our mediation model is deﬁnitely interesting, but beyond the scope of the present paper.
16To simplify the analysis, and keep the problem’s dimensionality in check, we adopt a fully symmetric
model. We believe that our results will hold approximately, for models that are close to symmetric.
17If the cake is a resource that can be depleted in a short period and does not have spillovers on relative
strength, then there is no commitment problem. If the cake sharing is instead to be interpreted as a durable
agreement for example on the exploitation of a future stream of resources or gains from trade, then the
commitment problem is non trivial. In this case the agreement could be about periodic tributes to be made
in perpetuity, and there are ways to implement the agreement with suﬃcient use of dynamic incentives.
See for example Schwartz and Sonin (2008).
18This feature will allow us to give graphical illustrations of all the results.
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Figure 1: Peace probability without communication (γ < 1)
equal split, and the denominator is the loss for waging war against a hawk rather than
accepting equal split. Given that γ is increasing in θ, we will also interpret situations with
low γ as situations of high intensity or cost of conﬂict.
We now calculate the splits (x, 1− x) and equilibria in the consequent war-declaration
game that maximize the ex ante probability of peace. First, note that for qθ/2+(1− q) pθ ≥
1/2, or λ ≥ γ, both doves and hawks choose peace in the peace-maximizing equilibrium of
the game with x = 1/2. When λ < γ, the probability of peace V is maximized to 1 − q
by choosing x so that all doves play peace, together with the hawk type of one of the two
players. This is achieved by setting x ≥ (1− q) pθ+qθ/2 and 1−x ≥ (1− q) θ/2+q (1− p) θ,
which is possible if and only if (1− q) pθ+q (1− p) θ+θ/2 ≤ 1, i.e., λ ≥ (γ − 1) / (γ + 3) —
note that this is always satisﬁed when γ ≤ 1. When this condition fails, the probability of
peace V is maximized to (1− q)2 by choosing x = 1/2 so that doves play peace, and hawks
declare war. In sum, the optimal probability of peace absent communication or mediation
is:
V =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− q)2 = 1
(λ+1)2
if λ < γ−1
γ+3
1− q = 1
λ+1
if γ−1
γ+3
≤ λ < γ
1 if λ ≥ γ.
as is displayed on Figure 1.
3 Communication Without Mediation
Communication Game We now consider the value of unmediated communication
in our basic game of conﬂict. We augment our basic game of conﬂict to include commu-
nication prior to the war declaration game. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following simple
communication protocol. After privately learning her type, each player i sends a mes-
sage mi ∈ {l, h}. The two messages are sent simultaneously. After observing each other
message, the players play a war-declaration game where the split x may depend on the
messages m = (m1, m2) . Their strategy in the war declaration game may depend also on
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the realization of a public randomization device. With probability p, the randomization
device coordinates the players on both playing peace in the war declaration game, and with
converse probability, war takes place. The peace probability p may depend on the public
message m.
Of course, in equilibrium, the players must be willing to follow the recommendation of
the public randomization device in the war declaration game with splits x (m) , and must
obey the, possibly mixed, communication strategies. We will determine the equilibrium
with the smallest ex ante probability of war. That is, we will calculate the optimal values
of the split x(·) and the probabilities p(·) subject to the constraints that players are willing
to use the equilibrium communication strategies, and to follow the recommendations of the
randomization device.
Before proceeding to calculate the equilibria, we brieﬂy describe the characteristics of
our communication protocol. Relative to the benchmark without communication, we have
introduced one round of binary cheap talk, and a public randomization device coordinating
the play in the ﬁnal war-declaration game. Following Aumann and Hart (2003), such a
public randomization device can be replicated by an additional round of communication
(using so-called jointly controlled lotteries). Hence our game can be reformulated as a two-
round communication game. For the sake of tractability and comparability with optimal
mediation, we do not consider the possibility of further rounds of cheap talk.19
The consideration of binary messages is natural because the type space is binary. As long
as attention is restricted to pure-strategy equilibria, of course, this restriction is without
loss of generality. The restriction to a ﬁxed split x (m), for every m, rather than the
consideration of a lottery over splits, is also without loss of generality.20 Finally, we point
out that, as described above, the game form encapsulates one minor shortcut: We have
assumed that, with probability 1 − p(m), war takes place without the contestants being
called to play the war declaration game. This is without loss of generality, because war
can be started unilaterally, and hence both players declaring war is always an equilibrium
of the war declaration game.21
19Aumann and Hart (2003) provide examples of games in which longer, indeed unbounded, communica-
tion protocols improve upon ﬁnite round communication.
20Note ﬁrst that if some splits in a lottery induce war on the equilibrium path, i.e., after both players
choose the equilibrium strategy at the communication stage, then such splits can be replaced with no
loss by a war recommendation. After this change, we can replace without loss any lottery over peaceful
recommendations with its certainty equivalent: A deterministic recommendation equal to the expected
recommendation of the lottery, assigned with probability equal to the lottery’s aggregate probability of
peaceful recommendation. In fact, at the war declaration stage, the requirement that the players accept
such a deterministic average split is less stringent than the requirement that they accept all splits in the
support of the lottery. Further, lotteries over peaceful splits aﬀect each player’s equilibrium payoﬀ at
the communication stage only through their expectations. Finally, the payoﬀ of a player who deviates at
the communication stage turns out to be convex in the recommeded split. Hence, the deviation payoﬀ
is lower when replacing a lottery with its certainty equivalent, thus making the equilibrium requirement
less stringent. The reason for the convexity of the deviation payoﬀ is that, oﬀ the equilibrium path, the
player optimally chooses whether to declar war or accept the split conditionally on the split realized with
the lottery. Hence, the expected value of the lottery oﬀ the equilibrium path is the maximum between the
realized split and the war payoﬀ, a convex function.
21While for some splits x, such an equilibrium may be weakly dominated, we could expand the war
declaration game by including a small ﬁrst-strike advantage, and make the war equilibrium always strict.
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Pure-strategy Equilibria We momentarily ignore mixed strategies by the players
at the message stage. Those will be considered in the next subsection. Evidently, there
is always a pooling equilibrium in which both types choose the same reporting strategy,
and whose outcomes coincide with the equilibrium of the war-declaration game without
communication. We now consider separating equilibrium, i.e., equilibrium in which each
player truthfully reveals her type.
We here consider only equilibria with splits x (m) and probabilities p (m) that are sym-
metric across players. Such symmetry restriction entails that x(h, h) = x(l, l) = 1/2, and
that, given that the message space contains only two elements, we then only need to ﬁnd
another split value, i.e., b ≡ x(h, l) = 1 − x(l, h). We shall later see that this restriction
is without loss of generality, because the separating equilibrium which minimizes the ex-
ante probability of peace is calculated by solving a linear program.22 To shorten notation
further, we let pL ≡ p(l, l), pH ≡ p(h, h) and pM ≡ p(h, l) = p(l, h).
Armed with these deﬁnitions, the optimal separating equilibrium is characterized by
the following program. Maximize the peace probability
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q2(1− pH)
subject to the following ex post individual rationality (IR) constraints and ex interim incen-
tive compatibility constraints (IC∗L, IC
∗
H).
23 First, reporting truthfully must be optimal.
For the dove, this constraint (IC∗L) states that
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM max{b, θ/2}) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH max{1/2, (1− p)θ}) .
The right-hand side is the dove’s equilibrium payoﬀ. With probability 1− q, the opponent
is also a dove, in which case the equal split 1/2 occurs with probability pL and the payoﬀ
from war, θ/2, is collected with probability (1− pL) . With probability q, the opponent is
hawk. With probability pM , this leads to the split 1 − b, and with probability 1 − pM to
the payoﬀ from war (1− p) θ. The left-hand side is the expected payoﬀ from exaggerating
strength. When the opponent is dove, the split b is recommended with probability pM . In
principle, the player may deviate from the recommendation, and collect the war payoﬀ θ/2,
hence the payoﬀ is max {b, θ/2} . Further, war is recommended with probability 1 − pM .
When the opponent is hawk, the split 1/2 is recommended with probability pH , and war
with probability 1− pH .
22We will see that each player’s constraints are linear in the maximization arguments. Thus, the con-
straint set is convex. Hence, suppose that an asymmetric mechanism maximizes the probability of peace.
Because the set up is symmetric across player, the anti-symmetric mechanism, obtained interchanging the
players’ identities, is also optimal. But then, the constraint set being convex, it contains also the symmetric
mechanism obtained by mixing the above optimal mechanisms. As the objective function is linear in the
maximization argument, such symmetric mixed mechanism is also optimal.
23The “star” superscript refers to the fact that, when a player contemplates deviating at the message
stage, she also anticipates and takes into account that she might prefer to declare war ex post, even when
players are supposed to coordinate on peace. This explains the maxima on the right-hand side of the two
constraints.
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Similarly, for the hawk, the constraint (IC∗H)
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL max{1/2, pθ}) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM max{1− b, θ/2}) ,
must hold, where the left-hand side is the equilibrium payoﬀ and the right-hand side is the
expected payoﬀ from “hiding strength.”24
Second, players must ﬁnd it optimal to accept the split. Given that, in a separating
equilibrium, messages reveal types, this requires that
b ≥ pθ, 1− b ≥ (1− p)θ.
That is, a hawk facing a self-proclaimed dove must get a share b that makes war unproﬁtable
against a dove. Similarly, the dove’s share against a hawk cannot be so low that it is better
for her to go to war. The constraint that a player would accept an equal split when the
opponent’s type is the same as her own, 1/2 > θ/2, is always satisﬁed.
Solving this program yields the following characterization. We here omit the precise
equilibrium formula, presented in the Appendix, as it is quite burdensome.
Proposition 1 There is a unique best separating equilibrium in the communication game
without mediation. This equilibrium displays the following characteristics, for λ < γ:
• The ex ante probability of peace is strictly greater than in the absence of communica-
tion.
• Dove dyads do not ﬁght: pL = 1.
• Hawk dyads ﬁght with positive probability, pH < 1, and the low-type incentive com-
patibility constraint IC∗L binds.
• If γ ≥ 1 and/or λ ≥ (1 + γ)−1, then the high type incentive compatibility constraint
IC∗H does not bind and b = pθ; and further:
– if λ < γ/2, then hawk dyads ﬁght with probability one, pH = 0, and asymmetric
dyads ﬁght with positive probability, pM ∈ (0, 1) ;
– if λ ≥ γ/2 (which covers also the case λ ≥ (1+γ)−1), then hawk dyads ﬁght with
positive probability, pH ∈ (0, 1) , and asymmetric dyads do not ﬁght, pM = 0.
• If γ < 1 and λ < (1 + γ)−1, then IC∗H binds and b > pθ; and further pH = 0 and
pM ∈ (0, 1) for λ < γ/(1 + γ), whereas pH ∈ (0, 1) and pM = 1 otherwise.
24Although the constraints (IC∗
L
) and (IC∗
H
) are not linear because of the maxima and of the products
pMb, they can be made linear as follows. First, one replaces each constraint with four constraints in which
the left-hand sides equal the left-hand side of the original constraint with one of the four pairs of the
arguments of the two maxima, in lieu of the maxima. Second, one changes the variable b with pB = pMb
and the constraint 1/2 ≤ b ≤ 1 with pB ≤ pM ≤ 2pB.
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We now elaborate on the characterization described above.
First, the separating equilibrium always improves upon the war declaration game with-
out communication. While intuitive, this result is far from obvious: Whereas at least one
equilibrium of the communication game must be at least as good as the optimal war dec-
laration game equilibrium, it is not an obvious implication that the separating equilibrium
would strictly improve upon all equilibria without communication. Second, war is never
optimal when both players report low strength: pL = 1; intuitively, there is no need to
punish self-reported doves by means of war, as they receive lower splits on average than if
reporting to be hawks.
Third, the truth-telling constraint for the low type, IC∗L, is always binding. Given that
the incentive to exaggerate strength is always present and needs to be discouraged, there
needs to be positive probability of war following a high report. The most potent channel
through which the low type’s incentive to exaggerate strength can be kept in check, is by
assigning a positive probability of war whenever there are two self-proclaimed high types.
When λ is low (few high types) it is indeed optimal to set pH = 0 and pM > 0; whereas for
higher values of λ, pH < 1 and pM = 1. Threatening war with a hawk is more eﬀective to
deter a dove from exaggerating strength, than threatening war with a dove. Further, when
λ is suﬃciently high, the likelihood of a hawk opponent is suﬃciently high that prescribing
war against a dove is not needed at all to deter a dove to exaggerate strength. But when λ
is low, deterring misreporting by a dove requires having a positive probability of war when
exactly one of the players claims to be a hawk, in addition to having war for sure when
both claim to be.
Fourth, when the truth-telling constraint for the high type, IC∗H , is not binding, then
b = pθ; and when both truth-telling constraints are binding, then the ex-post IR constraint
b ≥ pθ does not bind. Hence, b is either pinned down by the ex-post IR constraint b ≥ pθ,
or by the joint interim truth-telling constraints. Intuitively, both (IC∗H) and the constraint
b ≥ pθ need b suﬃciently large to be satisﬁed. On the other hand, keeping in check the
(binding) constraint (IC∗L) requires keeping b as low as possible. Hence b will be such that
either IC∗H binds, or b = pθ.
The other properties of the characterization of Proposition 1 are best described distin-
guishing γ ≥ 1,and γ < 1.
Suppose ﬁrst that γ ≥ 1, so that the beneﬁts from war are suﬃciently high. Then
the ex-post IR constraint always binds, and hence b = pθ; and the interim high-type
truth-telling IC∗H constraint never binds. This is because the hawk hiding strength always
prefers to wage war (both against hawks and against doves). When b = pθ, the condition
γ ≥ 1 is equivalent to 1 − b ≤ θ/2. As a result, the hawk obtains the payoﬀ pθ against
doves, regardless of her message, whereas against hawks she obtains θ/2 for sure if hiding
strength, and either θ/2 (after a war recommendation) or 1/2 (after settlement) when
truthfully reporting.
Second, suppose that γ < 1. For λ ≤ 1/(1 + γ), the high-type truth-telling constraint
IC∗H binds, and b > pθ. To see why, suppose by contradiction that b = pθ. For γ < 1,
this would imply that 1− b > θ/2. Consider a hawk pretending to be a dove. If she meets
a dove, she can secure the payoﬀ pθ by waging war. This is also the payoﬀ for revealing
hawk and meeting a dove: She obtains pθ through war or through the split b = pθ. If she
meets a hawk, she gets 1 − b with probability pM and θ/2 with probability 1 − pM . By
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claiming to be a hawk, she gets 1/2 with probability pH and θ/2 with probability pM . But
we know that pM is larger than pH , and because 1 − b > θ/2, this gives an incentive to
pretend to be a dove (hiding strength) to secure peace more often than by revealing that
she is a hawk, which contradicts IC∗H . To make sure that both truth-telling constraints
are satisﬁed, we must have b > pθ, so as to reduce the payoﬀ from hiding strength: This
reduces both the payoﬀ from settling against a hawk when hiding strength and the payoﬀ
from settling against a dove when revealing to be hawk.
Next, note that pH increases in λ, as in the case of γ ≥ 1. Because the incentive to hide
strength decreases as pH increases relative to pM , we can reduce b as λ increases. When λ
reaches the threshold 1/(1+γ), the oﬀer b required for the high type truth-telling constraint
to bind is exactly pθ. Further increasing λ cannot induce a further decrease in b, because
the ex-post IR constraint b ≥ pθ becomes binding. So in the region where λ ∈ [1/(1+γ), γ],
the IC∗H constraint does not bind and b = pθ.
Figure 4 shows the probability of peace (our welfare measure here) in the best separating
equilibrium. For γ ≥ 1, we note that it is U-shaped in λ for λ ≤ γ/2, and decreasing in
λ when λ is between γ/2 and γ. To understand the forces leading to the U-shaped eﬀect
of λ in the lower region, note ﬁrst that an increase in λ shifts probability mass from the
LL dyad to the LH dyad and from the LH dyad to the HH dyad (the overall eﬀect on
the likelihood of the LH dyad is that it increases in λ if and only if λ < 1). Because
1 = pL ≥ pM > pH , these shifts make the probability of peace initially decrease in λ.
However, pM strictly increases in λ for λ ≤ γ/2, and eventually this makes the probability
of peace increase in λ. Interestingly, despite the fact that pH strictly increases in λ, for
λ > γ/2, it still does not grow fast enough to compensate for the shift in probability mass
towards the dyads with the higher probability of war. As a result, the probability of peace
decreases in λ when λ is between γ/2 and γ.
Figure 2: Probability of peace in the separating equilibrium
Mixed-strategy Equilibria This section considers mixed strategy equilibria. We
ﬁnd that the role of mixing in the unmediated communication game is relatively limited.
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The following result states that, while there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium where the
hawk randomizes between sending the high and low report, there exists a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which the dove randomizes.25 Furthermore, in a limited parameter region,
depicted in Figure 3, such a mixed strategy equilibrium yields a higher ex ante peace
probability than the separating equilibrium. The speciﬁc formulas for the region where
mixing improves upon the separating equilibrium are very cumbersome, and hence relegated
to the Appendix. But it is interesting to note that mixing may improve only in a small
subset of the parameter region where both ex interim IC* constraints bind: In fact, mixing
by the dove may relax the incentive of the hawk to hide strength. We conclude this
discussion by pointing out that also the extent of the welfare improvement is quite limited.
An immediate comparison between Figure 3 and Figure 2 shows that mixing adds very
little. We summarize our ﬁndings as follows.
Proposition 2 Allowing players to play mixed strategies in the unmediated communication
game, the optimal equilibrium is such that the hawk always sends message h and the dove
sends message l with probability σ, where σ < 1 only in the parameter region depicted in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Welfare in the best (pure or mixed) equilibrium, and region where mixing occurs
4 Mediation
In the previous section, we have characterized the optimal equilibrium in the case in
which players send public messages. In this section, we consider an active mediator who
collects the players’ private messages and makes optimal recommendations.
We modify the game form to account for such a mediator. In the ﬁrst stage, messages
are no longer public. They are separately reported to a mediator, who then proposes the
split and randomly correlates the play in the consequent war declaration game. More
precisely, the version of the revelation principle proved in Myerson (1982) guarantees that
the following game form entails no loss in generality:
25In this subsection, and this subsection only, attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. That is,
we did not establish whether asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria may yield a higher welfare.
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- After being informed of her type, each player i privately sends a report mi ∈ {l, h}
to the mediator.
- Given reports m = (m1, m2), the mediator recommends a split (b, 1− b) according to
some cumulative distribution function F (b|m) with support [0, 1 + ] , for some  > 0.
Without loss of generality, we interpret 1−F (1|m) as the probability with which the
mediator recommends war.26 The mediator’s recommendation is public.
- War takes place if recommended. Otherwise, the contestants play the war declaration
game with the recommended split.
Again by the revelation principle, we may restrict attention without loss of generality
to distributions F such that truthful type revelation, and obedience to the mediator’s rec-
ommendation are part of an equilibrium of the above game form. As before, this imposes
both ex interim incentive compatibility constraints and ex post individual rationality con-
straints, which we now describe. To simplify notation, we restrict attention to mechanisms
symmetric across players, where F (·|m1, m2) = 1 − F (·|m2, m1) for all (m1, m2) , and to
discrete distributions F. We shall later see that these restrictions entail no loss of generality.
Let Pr[m−i, b,mi] denote the equilibrium joint probability that the players send mes-
sages (mi, m−i) and that the mediator proposes split (b, 1−b); and let Pr[b,mi] = Pr[h, b,mi]+
Pr[l, b,mi]. When player i is a hawk, in equilibrium she reports mi = h, and ex post indi-
viduality rationality requires that
bPr[b, h] ≥ Pr[l, b, h]pθ + Pr[h, b, h]θ/2, for all b ∈ [0, 1] (1)
which ensures that, if recommended the split b, i.e., for all b such that Pr[b, h] > 0, the
hawk prefers accepting the split to starting a war. Similarly, when i is a dove, ex post
individual rationality dictates that:
bPr[b, l] ≥ Pr[h, b, l](1− p)θ + Pr[l, b, l]θ/2, for all b ∈ [0, 1] . (2)
Ex-interim incentive compatibility requires that, when player i is a hawk she truthfully
reports mi = h. The associated constraint (IC
∗
H) dictates that
q(1− F (1|hh))θ/2 + (1− q)(1− F (1|hl))pθ +
∫ 1
0
bdF (b|h) ≥ q(1− F (1|lh))θ/2 +
(1− q)(1− F (1|ll))pθ +
∫ 1
0
max{b,Pr[l|b, l]pθ + Pr[h|b, l]θ/2}dF (b|l), (3)
where Pr[m−i|b,mi] = Pr[m−i, b,mi]/Pr[b,mi] whenever Pr[b,mi] > 0, and F (·|mi) ≡
qF (·|mi, h) + (1 − q)F (·|mi, l), for mi and m−i taking values l and h. Note that, as in
the optimal separating equilibrium program, player i might behave opportunistically after
deviating, as reﬂected by the maxima on the right-hand side.
26The term “war recommendation” is part of the game theoretic jargon we use to describe the formal
model. It should not be taken literally: In the real world, mediators do not literally recommend war, but
they may walk away the mediation table, and this usually results in conﬂict escalation by the contestants.
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Similarly, to ensure truth-telling by player i when a dove, the following constraint (IC∗L)
must be satisﬁed:
q(1− F (1|lh))(1− p)θ + (1− q)(1− F (1|ll))θ/2 +
∫ 1
0
(1− b)dF (b|l) ≥ q(1− F (1|hh))(1− p)θ +
(1− q)(1− F (1|lh))θ/2 +
∫ 1
0
max{1− b,Pr[l|b, h]θ/2 + Pr[h|b, h](1− p)θ}dF (b|h). (4)
In the optimal solution, the mediator seeks to minimize the probability of war, i.e.,
(1− q)2(1− F (1|hh)) + 2q(1− q)(1− F (1|lh)) + q2(1− F (1|ll)).
Because recommendations need to be self-enforcing, there is a priori no reason to restrict
the mediator in the number of splits to which he assigns positive probability. In fact, rec-
ommendations convey information about the most likely opponents’ revealed types, and it
might be in the mediator’s best interest to scramble such information by means of multiple
recommendations. Nevertheless, Proposition 3 below shows that relatively simple mech-
anisms reach the optimal probability of peace among all possible mechanisms, including
asymmetric ones. Such mechanisms are described as follows. Given reports (h, h), the
mediator recommends the peaceful split (1/2, 1/2) with probability qH , and war with prob-
ability 1− qH . Given reports (h, l), the mediator recommends the peaceful split (1/2, 1/2)
with probability qM , the split (β, 1 − β) with probability pM , and war with probability
1−pM − qM , for some β ≥ 1/2. Given reports (l, l), the mediator recommends the peaceful
split (1/2, 1/2) with probability qL, the splits (β, 1− β) and (1− β, β) with probability pL
each, and war with probability 1− 2pL − qL.
Again, we here omit the precise and quite cumbersome solution formula, presented in
the Appendix.
Proposition 3 A solution to the mediator’s problem is such that, for all λ < γ
• Doves do not ﬁght, qL + 2pL = 1.
• The low-type incentive compatibility constraint IC∗L binds, whereas the high-type in-
centive compatibility constraint IC∗H does not, and b = pθ.
• For γ ≥ 1 and λ > γ/2, hawk dyads ﬁght with positive probability, qH ∈ (0, 1) , mixed
dyads do not ﬁght pM + 2qM = 1, and mediation strictly improves upon cheap talk.
• For γ ≥ 1 and λ ≤ γ/2, the solution exactly reproduces the separating equilibrium
of the cheap talk game (speciﬁcally, qL = 1, qM = 0, pM ∈ (0, 1) and qH = 0), and
mediation yields the same welfare as cheap talk.
• For γ < 1, the probability of unequal splits among dove dyads pL is bounded above
zero, and mediation strictly improves upon cheap talk.
We now comment on the solution and we make some comparisons with the optimal
separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1.
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Suppose that γ > 1. If λ > γ/2, then qM > 0: the mediator sometimes recommends
the equal split (1/2, 1/2) when one player reports to be a hawk, and the other claims to
be a dove. In this way, the ex post IR constraint of the high type who is recommended
the equal split becomes binding. We remark that this ex post constraint was slack in the
unmediated equilibrium. By making a slack constraint binding, the mediator increases the
probability of peace. Indeed, the mediator lowers the gain from pretending to be a hawk,
by making exaggerating strength less proﬁtable against doves. When λ ≤ γ/2 instead,
qH = qM = 0 and the mediator does not improve upon unmediated communication. In this
case, in fact, in both the mediated and the best (unmediated) separating equilibrium, war
needs to occur with probability one in dyads of hawks, to avoid that doves misreport their
type. But then the above-mentioned slack constraint is not relevant for either program,
and the mediator cannot improve upon unmediated communication.
In contrast with the case of γ ≥ 1, the mediator always yields a strict welfare im-
provement when γ < 1. When λ > 1/(1 + γ), so that b = pθ in the perfectly separating
equilibrium, it is also the case that λ > γ/2 (note that 1/ (1 + γ) > γ/2), and hence the
mediator helps for the same reasons as when γ ≥ 1. When λ < 1/ (1 + γ), the mediator
makes sure that the IC∗H constraint is satisﬁed with β = pθ. In fact, the mediator oﬀers
1 − β with positive probability when both players report to be doves. By doing so, the
mediator makes sure that a hawk hiding strength will wage war when proposed 1 − β.
This eliminates the incentive to hide strength in order to seek peace against hawks that we
observed in the unmediated equilibrium. Hence, the expected payoﬀ of hiding strength is
lower, and the IC∗H constraint is satisﬁed with β = pθ. Note that the ex post individual
rationality constraint b ≥ pθ was slack in the unmediated equilibrium. By making this ra-
tionality constraint binding, the mediator can improve the objective function, i.e. increase
the probability of peace.
Figure 4 shows the probability of peace in the mediated game compared to the proba-
bility of peace induced by the best separating equilibrium.
We can now precisely answer the ﬁrst set of questions presented in the introduction:
• When does mediation improve on unmediated communication?
– When the intensity and/or cost of conﬂict is high (γ low), mediation always
brings about strict welfare improvements with respect to unmediated cheap-
talk.
– When conﬂict is not expected to be very costly or intense (high γ), on the
other hand, mediation provides a large improvement in welfare if and only if the
proportion of hawks is intermediate, i.e., for high expected power asymmetry.
• How does mediation improve on unmediated communication?
– When the proportion of hawks is intermediate (high expected power asymmetry),
the mediator lowers the reward for a dove from mimicking a hawk, by not always
giving the lion’s share to a declared hawk facing a dove (or, equivalently by not
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Figure 4: Probability of peace in the mediated vs. unmediated case, and region where
mediation dominates
always revealing a self-reported hawk that she is facing a dove). This lowers the
incentive to exaggerate strength and achieve a favorable peace settlement with
a dove.
– When the probability of facing a hawk is low and conﬂict is expected to be
costly, the mediator’s strategy is instead to oﬀer with some probability unequal
split to two parties reporting low type (or, equivalently the mediator does not
always reveal a dove that she is facing a dove). This lowers the incentive to hide
strength and seek peace with a hawk.
To conclude this section, we compare mediation with the mixed-strategy equilibria of
the cheap talk game. We ﬁrst note that such comparison is restricted to a small parameter
region, where γ < 1, i.e., the intensity and/or cost of conﬂict is high. Further, the beneﬁts
of mediation over mixing in an unmediated communication game are well known (see,
e.g. Aumann 1974). By randomizing over recommendations, the mediator can reproduce
any distribution induced by mixing. In unmediated communication, however, because
players must mix independently of each other, they cannot generate the optimal correlated
distribution chosen by the mediator. In practice, the mixing by the dove may improve
welfare upon the pure-strategy equilibrium, but at the cost of inducing war with positive
probability within dove dyads. This does not occur with a mediator, who induces war only
when at least one of the players is a hawk.
5 The Role of Enforcement
To analyze the role of mediation, we have chosen to use a canonical model where war
is a costly lottery and may take place due to asymmetric information about the players’
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strength or resolve. Even though the cause of war is asymmetric information, the analysis
of the optimal mediation problem involves also a signiﬁcant enforcement problem. Indeed,
countries are sovereign, and enforcement of contracts or agreements is often impossible.
Since war can be started unilaterally, we have incorporated ex post IR and ex interim
IC* constraints in the formulation of the optimal mediation program. Therefore in our
model, the residual ex ante chance of war that results in the optimal mediation solution,
can be thought as being due to a combination of asymmetric information and enforcement
problems.
The only role we have so far attributed to mediation is to optimally manage information
elicited by the conﬂicting parties. One might also wonder whether the mediator could
further reduce the ex ante probability of war if it were endowed with enforcement power.
The answer to this question can be obtained by simply comparing our ﬁndings with those
in Bester and Wa¨rneryd (2006): Rather than imposing ex post IR constraints and ex
interim IC* constraints like we do, they impose ex interim IR constraints and ex interim IC
constraints. In practice, they only require that conﬂicting parties are willing to participate
to the mediation process, and to reveal their information to the mediator. But mediator’s
recommendations are enforceable by external actors, such as the international community or
the mediator itself. Hence, they abstract from the enforcement problem that we introduce,
and their model is more suitable to describe arbitration than the pure mediation that we
have so far considered.
Formally, invoking the version of the revelation principle proved by Myerson (1979),
the Bester-Wa¨rneryd problem can be expressed as follows. The parties truthfully report
their types L,H to the arbitrator. The arbitrator recommends peaceful settlement with
probability p (m) after report m. Because recommendations are enforced by an external
agency, we shall later see that can restrict attention without loss of generality to a single
peaceful recommendation x (m) , for each report pair m.27 Again, symmetry is without loss
of generality because the arbitrator’s program is linear, and it entails that the settlement is
(1/2, 1/2) if the two players report the same type, that the split is (b, 1− b) if the reports
are (h, l), and (1− b, b) if they are (l, h), for some b ∈ [1/2, 1] . We simplify notation letting
pL = p (l, l) , pM = p (l, h) = p (h, l) and pH = p (h, h) .
In sum, the arbitrator chooses b, pL, pM and pH so as to solve the program
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q2 (1− pH)
subject to ex interim individual rationality (for the hawk and dove, respectively)
(1− q) (pMb + (1− pM) pθ) + q (pH/2 + (1− pH) θ/2) ≥ (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
(1− q) (pL/2 + (1− pL) θ/2) + q (pM (1− b) + (1− pM) (1− p) θ) ≥ (1− q) θ/2 + q (1− p) θ,
and to the ex interim incentive compatibility constraints (for the hawk and dove, respec-
27In fact, both participation and revelation decisions are taken before knowing the arbitrator’s recom-
mendation, and hence the players’ payoﬀs depend only on the expected recommendation, and not on the
realized one. Hence, as in footnote 20, any lottery over peaceful recommendations can be replaced without
loss with its certainty equivalent.
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tively):
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM(1− b)) ,
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pMb) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH/2) .
In general, the solution of the program with an arbitrator that enforces outcomes provides
an upper bound over the performance of all possible mechanisms in the mediation program
without enforcement power, seen in section 4. Surprisingly, however, we show that the solu-
tion of our mediation program, in which the mediator’s recommendations are self-enforcing,
yields exactly the same welfare as the solution of Bester and Wa¨rneryd’s program, in which
the arbitrator can enforce outcomes.28 Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd, for λ ≤ γ/2, the mechanisms
with and without enforcement coincide. For λ ≤ γ/2, the mechanisms with and without
enforcement coincide. When λ > γ/2, the optimal mechanism with enforcement is such
that b < pθ, which is not self-enforcing. But the optimal mechanism without enforcement
obfuscates the players’ reports, and this obfuscation succeds in fully circumventing the
enforcement problem.
Proposition 4 An arbitrator who can enforce recommendation is exactly as eﬀective in
promoting peace as a mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.
This striking result can be intuitively explained as follows. First, note that the dove’s
IC constraint and hawk’s ex interim IR constraint are the only ones binding in the so-
lution of the mediator’s program with enforcement power. Conversely, the only binding
constraints in the mediator’s program with self-enforcing recommendations are the dove’s
IC* constraint and the two ex post hawk’s IR constraints. Recall that, in our solution, the
hawk is always indiﬀerent between war and peace if recommended a settlement. Further,
the dove’s IC* constraint in the mediator’s problem with self-enforcing recommendation is
identical to the dove’s IC constraint in the mediator’s program with enforcement power,
because a dove never wages war after exaggerating strength in the solution of mediator’s
problem with self-enforcing recommendation.
Further, the hawk’s ex interim IR constraint integrates the two binding hawk’s ex
post IR constraints in the mediator’s problem with self-enforcing recommendation. While
requiring a constraint to hold in expectation is generally a weaker requirement than having
the two constraints, it turns out that the induced welfare is the same in our model of
conﬂict. This fact is easier to understand when λ ≤ γ/2, as in this case the only settlement
ever accorded to a hawk is b, when the opponent is dove. Crucially, for any mechanism
with this property, the ex interim IR and the ex post IR constraints trivially coincide. Let
28This result greatly facilitates the proof of Proposition 3. It is enough to establish that the simple
mechanism characterized there, and described in closed form in the Appendix, satisﬁes the more stringent
constraints of our mediation probem without enforcement power. Then, because this mechanism achieves
the same welfare as the solution of the arbitration problem, it must be optimal, a fortiori, in our mediation
problem.
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us now consider the case λ > γ/2. In this case, the optimal truthful arbitration mechanism
prescribes a settlement b < pθ that is not ex-post IR for a hawk meeting a dove, as well as
prescribing a settlement with slack, equal to 1/2, to same type dyads. The mediator cannot
reproduce this mechanism. But it circumvents the problem with the obfuscation strategy
whereby the hawk is made exactly indiﬀerent between war and peace when recommended
either the split 1/2 or the split b = pθ. Hence, it optimally rebalances the ex-post IR
constraints so as to achieve the same welfare as the arbitrator.
We can now answer the last question that we posed in the introduction.
• Does enforcement power help? How do mediation and arbitration diﬀer in terms of
conﬂict resolution?
– In our war-declaration game, there is no diﬀerence in terms of optimal ex-ante
probability of peace between the two institutions.
– Speciﬁcally, either the two optimal mechanism coincide, for λ low relative to
γ, or the mediator’s optimal obsfuscation strategies fully circumvent his lack of
enforcement power.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conﬂict resolution in international
relations. We have determined when and how unmediated communication and mediation
reduce the ex ante probability of conﬂict, in a simple game where conﬂict is due to asym-
metric information. From the analysis of this paper we have drawn a number of lessons.
First of all, we have shown when mediation improves upon unmediated communication.
Mediation is particularly useful when the intensity of conﬂict and/or cost of war is high
(low θ); when power asymmetry has little impact on the probability of winning; and even
when neither θ nor p is low, mediation can still be useful when the ex ante chance of power
asymmetry is high (intermediate q). While the core of our analysis has considered the
optimal strategy of mediators who are not endowed with enforcement powers, we have con-
cluded the analysis by showing that, surprisingly, an arbitrator who can enforce outcomes
is exactly as eﬀective as a mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.
Second, we have shown how mediation improves upon unmediated communication. This
is achieved by not reporting to a player with probability one that the opponent has revealed
that she is weak. Speciﬁcally, when the ex ante chance of power asymmetry is high, the
mediator is mostly eﬀective over unmediated communication in its ability to keep in check
the temptation to exaggerate strength by a dove. The mediator lowers the reward from
mimicking a hawk by not always giving the lion’s share to a hawk facing a dove. This
allows to reduce the probability of war between hawks, and hence the ex ante probability
of war. Instead, when the expected intensity or cost of conﬂict are high, regardless of
the expected degree of uncertainty, the mediator is mostly eﬀective in improving upon
unmediated communication in the task of reducing the temptation to hide strength by a
strong player. The mediator’s optimal strategy in this case is to lower the reward from
mimicking a dove by giving sometimes an unequal split to two parties reporting being a
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low type. This allows to lower the split proposed to avoid war between a hawk and a dove.
In turn, this allows to reduce the probability of war of the hawk-dove dyad.
Because the main purpose of this paper is to provide a showcase for the usefulness of
mechanism design in the formal study of international relations, we do not attempt to
deliver a complete theory of mediation, here. We have mentioned some of the speciﬁc
characteristics of our mediators in the introduction. We now discuss some issues relative to
mediation that we did not solve in this paper, and that, we believe may lead to fruitful future
research. But at the same time, we take the opportunity to defend the wide applicability of
our current work, by delineating circumstances in the world of international relation under
which none of such issues is likely to be a major concern.
Our analysis takes as given how the process starts, and how it ends. Because we
consider the games with and without a mediator separately, our analysis did not address
the incentives of each disputant to seek the assistance of a mediator in the ﬁrst place, given
that such a call for mediation is likely to convey information. Another related issue that
we have not explored here involves the ex ante incentives of players to engage in strategic
militarization (see, for example, Meirowitz and Sartori, 2008). We have also taken our
mediator as having commitment power, and while we do not assume that disputants have
commitment power, we have ignored their incentives to re-negotiate.
In order for mediation to occur, both disputants must consent to the involvement of a
mediator as a third party. Individual interests, rather than “shared values” are the main
driving force behind acceptance of mediation (Princen, 1992). Whether or not a party
gains from accepting mediation depends on how such a decision will be perceived by the
other party, and what such a party can guarantee in the absence of a mediator. These
features of the problem naturally lead to multiplicity of equilibria. Suppose in fact that
we were to augment our mediation game to include a stage where, immediately after being
informed of their types, the contestants simultaneously and independently choose whether
to accept the mediator or resort unmediated cheap talk. Further assume, for the sake of
realism, that mediation will take place if and only if both players agree. One can identify
both equilibria where mediation always takes place and equilibria where it never occurs.
As an example of the latter, consider an equilibrium where all types of players choose
to reject the mediator, and that if a player deviates and asks for a mediator, the opponent
will maintain her initial beliefs on the deviator’s type. In this case, evidently, both players
are always indiﬀerent between accepting mediation or not, as this is irrelevant because
the opponent vetoes mediation in equilibrium. Exactly for this reason, the postulated oﬀ-
path beliefs can be considered reasonable. An equilibrium where the optimal mediation we
characterized takes place is the one in which both players agree to mediation, and if one
player deviates and rejects the mediator, the players will maintain their ex-ante beliefs,
will pool in the communication stage, and declare war in the ﬁnal stage. In practice, these
oﬀ-path behavior can be described as each player threatening the other “not to listen and
declare war, unless a mediator is called in”. Although credible, such a harsh punishment
may not always be realistic; but, by construction, it delivers the highest possible welfare in
the game. Deviations are deterred in this equilibrium, because the outcome of rejecting the
mediator is equivalent to triggering war, and its deterrence is equivalent to an ex interim
individual rationality condition, which is weaker than the ex-post individual rationality
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conditions we already imposed to solve our program.
To conclude on the matter of the choice of the mechanism by informed party, we note
that scholars often put forward other motives for desiring mediation. Bercovitch (1992,
1997), for instance, argues that disputants might view mediation as an expression of their
commitment to peaceful conﬂict resolution, and seek it out of a desire to improve their
relationships with each other. Ultimately, whether and how the acceptance of a mediator
aﬀects perceptions and incentives is an empirical question. Using the ICB data, Wilkenfeld
et al. (2005) argue that symmetric crises are more likely to be mediated than asymmetric
ones, suggesting that mediation initiative might fail when power disparity is extreme. Note,
however, that our model only considers (ex ante) symmetric crises, and there seems to be
no empirical evidence that would correlate the occurrence (as opposed to the success) of
mediation with the level of uncertainty.
Turning to the question of strategic militarization, we believe that our model can provide
a simple benchmark to explore the ex ante incentives for countries to arm when diﬀerent
conﬂict resolution institutions prevail, and in particular when focusing on the optimal one
(the mediator we study in this paper). Speciﬁcally, our results may be related with the
results by a recent paper by Meirowitz and Ramsay (2009). Suppose in fact that, prior
to enter a crisis, the two players must costly and secretly invest in their military might.
Meirowitz and Ramsay (2009) characterize the equilibrium investment strategies in relation
to any general crisis-resolution mechanism, and hence any bargaining or communication
protocol, that satisfy ex interim IC constraints (Theorem 2). Because we show that in
our simple game, optimal arbitration and optimal mediation coincide, and both can be
characterized via ex interim IC and IR constraints, it would be interesting to assess the
implications of their results in the contest of the optimal crisis-resolution mechanisms that
we characterize in this paper.
We now turn to our assumption that the mediator is fully capable to commit. We
interpret the outcome of war as a failure of the disputants to agree with the conditions set
by the mediator. Our analysis suggests that the mediator’s success relies on its ability to
employ so-called action-forcing events. The importance of using such events is stressed by
Watkins (1998). Mediators are well aware of the importance of being able to break oﬀ talks
with no intention of resuming them. For the technique to be eﬀective, a deadline must be
credible. According to Avi Gil, one of the key architects of the Oslo peace process, “A
deadline is a great but risky tool. Great because without a deadline it’s diﬃcult to end
negotiations. [The parties] tend to play more and more, because they have time. Risky
because if you do not meet the deadline, either the process breaks down, or deadlines lose
their meaning” (Watkins, 1998). Among the many cases in which this technique was used,
see for instance Curran and Sebenius (2003)’s account of how a deadline was employed
by former Senator George Mitchell in the Northern Ireland negotiations. Committing to
such deadlines might be somewhat easier for professional mediators whose reputation is at
stake, but they have been also used both by unoﬃcial and oﬃcial individuals, including
Pope John Paul II and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.29 Meanwhile, institutions
29See Bebchik (2002) on how Clinton and Ross attempted to impress upon Arafat the urgency of accepting
the proposal being oﬀered for a ﬁnal settlement, calling it a “damn good deal” that would not be within
his grasp indeﬁnitely.
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like the United Nations increasingly sets time limits to their involvement upfront (see, for
instance, the U.N. General Assembly report, 2000).
Nevertheless, it is a fact that, no matter their moral authority, mediators may sometimes
struggle to walk away when the deadline expires (as Pope John Paul II found out in the
Beagle Channel dispute, for instance). This fact suggests the formulation and solution of
a model of mediation that introduces limited mediator’s commitment, a seemingly fairly
involved theoretical task. One of the main issues is the identiﬁcation of a game form
and mechanism space that do not entail loss of generality. It is known, in fact, that the
revelation principle may fail in the presence of limited commitment (see, for example,
Bester and Strausz, 2000). A promising game form may be the following. Suppose that the
contestants simultaneously and independently send binary messages to the mediator, who
then randomizes over recommendations consisting in pairs of beliefs q1 and q2 that player
1 and 2 respectively is a hawk, with the consistency requirement that recommendations
equal beliefs in the war declaration game, given the player’s equilibrium strategies and the
mediator’s randomization. However, this game is not of easy solution due to the richness
of the mediator’s recommendation space.30 Hence, we leave its solution to future research.
Finally, we have not assumed that disputants are able to commit, and all the mediator’s
recommendations are self-enforcing. However, there is a sense in which such recommenda-
tions need not be renegotiation-proof, as they might be Pareto-dominated for the players.
For instance, when there is common belief that both players are hawks, they would be
better oﬀ settling for an equal split rather than going to war, although doing so is part of
our solution. However, while this limitation arises in our model, a necessary incomplete
representation of reality, renegotiation-proofness does not seem to be a ﬁrst and foremost
concern of real world mediators. Recall that we interpret a war recommendation, as an
impasse or break-down of the mediaton process that results in the mediator’s quitting the
process. It is not overly realistic to think that, after the mediator quit, contestants who
struggled to ﬁnd an agreement in the presence of the mediator, will autonomously sit down
at the negotiation table again, in search for a Pareto improving agreement. Indeed, while
the literature on the causes of conﬂict underlines that contestants may not be able to in-
dividually commit to peaceful resolutions of conﬂicts, it may well be the case that they
can jointly or even individually commit to belligerant resolutions, when such commitments
are ex-ante valuable. Audience costs, for instance, are recognized to provide an important
channel that makes war threats credible (see, for instance, Tomz, 2007).
While mostly a theoretical issue, we do not claim that the question of renegotiation
proofness can be ignored in this discussion, but only that fully addressing the issue is
beyond the scope of this paper. A technical diﬃculty lies in the fact that the theory
of games with incomplete information has not delivered a unanimously accepted deﬁni-
tion of renegotiation-proofness in this class of games. The deﬁnitions that apply to our
game usually yield non-existence, given the restriction imposed by ex post individual ra-
tionality and incentive compatibility. Forges (1990), for instance, deﬁnes an equilibrium
renegotiation-proof if it is the case that, for every further (exogenous) proposal that play-
30A further complication is that, oﬀ the equilibrium path, the beliefs (q1, q2) are not common knowledge.
Nevertheless, the equilibrium calculation can be completed as usual, by determining the best response of
the deviator in the war declaration game, against the (equilibrium) strategy of the contestant who did not
deviate.
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ers can simultaneously accept or reject after the mediator’s recommendation, players would
not unanimously prefer the exogenous proposal. Unfortunately, it can be shown that this
requirement is impossible to satisfy in our problem.31 Yet there is something disturbing
about an equilibrium in which players agree on going to war despite the existence of an
agreement that both players commonly know to be both self-enforcing and mutually ben-
eﬁcial. Coming up with an appropriate deﬁnition capturing this intuition appears like an
important issue for future research. Note, however, that any such deﬁnition would exac-
erbate the incentives for the mediator to obfuscate the information that he owns, so as to
prevent the possibility that players that are supposed to go to war commonly believe that
some speciﬁc, peaceful split is better for both of them.
31At the renegotiation stage, on the equilibrium path, the war-declaration stage can be viewed as a static
Bayesian game. Let qi denote the probability that i is a dove at this stage. If q1 < 1 and q2 < 1, then
doves reach this stage with positive probability, and in that event, both players would prefer the exogenous
proposal “peace and an equal split” to the recommendation of war. Hence there must be peace in such
a subform. If q1 = 1 but q2 < 1, then player 2’s dove and player 1 would agree on the proposal “peace
and split pθ;” and if q1 = q2 = 1, they would agree on the proposal “peace and equal split.” Hence, the
only candidate for a renegotiation-proof equilibrium involves the mediator always suggesting peace, which
cannot satisfy incentive compatibility and ex post rationality.
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Appendix A - Unmediatred Communication
Proof of Proposition 1 All the statements in the proposition, but the comparison with
no-communication, follow from the following characterization lemma:
Lemma 1 The best separating equilibrium is characterized as follows.
1. Suppose that γ ≤ 1.
(a) When λ < γ/(1 + γ), both ex interim IC* constraints bind,
b > pθ, pH = 0, pM =
1
(1 + γ)(1− λ) , and V =
1 + γ + λ(1− γ)
(1 + γ)(1− λ)(1 + λ)2 .
(b) When λ ∈ [γ/(1 + γ),min{1/(1 + γ), γ}], both IC* constraints bind,
b > pθ, pM = 1, pH = 1− γ
(1 + γ)λ
, and V = 1− γλ
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2
.
(c) When λ ∈ [1/(1 + γ), γ), only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
λ(2 + γ)
, and V =
2(1 + λ) + γ
2 + γ + λ(2 + γ)
.
2. Suppose that γ > 1.
(a) When λ < γ/2, only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pH = 0, pM =
1
1 + γ − 2λ, and V =
1 + γ
(1 + γ − 2λ)(1 + λ)2 .
(b) When λ ∈ [γ/2, γ), only the IC∗L constraint binds,
b = pθ, pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
λ(γ + 2)
, and V = 1− γλ
(2 + γ)(1 + λ)
.
The proof of lemma 1 proceeds in two parts.
Part 1 (γ ≥ 1).
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q2(1− pH)
subject to the high-type ex post IR constraints:
b ≥ pθ
2
to the probability constraints:
pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH
and ex ante low-type IC* constraint:
(1− q)
(
(1− pL)θ
2
+ pL
1
2
)
+ q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q)
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pMb
)
+ q
(
(1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH 1
2
)
Step 1. We want to show that pL = 1. We ﬁrst note that setting pL = 1 maximizes the
LHS of the relaxed low-type IC* constraint and does not aﬀect the RHS. It is immediate
to see that the high-type ex post constraint is not aﬀected either.
Step 2. We want to show that the relaxed low-type IC* constraint binds. Suppose it does
not. It is possible to increase pH thus decreasing the objective function without violating
the constraint (note that there is no constraint that pH < 1 in the relaxed problem).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type ex post constraint binds. Suppose it does
not. Then b > pθ, and it is possible to reduce b without violating the ex post constraint.
But this makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack, because −b appears in the LHS
and b in the RHS. Because step 2 concluded that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint cannot
be slack in the solution, we have proved that the ex post constraint cannot be slack.
Step 4. We want to show that for λ ≤ γ/2: pH = 0, pM = 11+γ−2λ in the relaxed
program. The low-type relaxed IC* constraint and ex post constraint deﬁne the function
pM =
(1− λpH(γ + 2))
(γ − 2λ + 1) , (5)
substituting this function into the objective function
W = 2(1− q)(1− pM) + q(1− pH)
duly simpliﬁed in light of step 1, we obtain the following expression:
W = pH
(2λ + γ + 3)λ
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1) +
2γ − 3λ + λγ − 2λ2
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1) ,
where we note that, because γ ≥ 2λ, the coeﬃcient of pH is positive and the whole expres-
sion is positive. Hence, minimization of W requires minimization pH . Setting pH = 0 and
solving for pM in (5) yields
pM =
1
1 + γ − 2λ.
3
Because λ ≤ γ/2, it follows that pM ≤ 1, as required. We note that the probability of war
equals:
C =
(
2γ − 3λ + λγ − 2λ2)λ
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1)2 .
Step 5. We want to show that for λ ≥ γ/2, pM = 1, pH = 2λ−γλ(γ+2) in the relaxed problem.
In light of the previous step, the solution pH = 0 yields pM > 1 and is not admissible when
λ > γ/2. Because pM decrease in pH in (5), the solution requires setting pM = 1 and, from
(5), pH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+2)
. When λ ≥ γ/2, pH ≥ 0 and hence the solution is admissible. We note
that the probability of war equals:
C =
γλ
(γ + 2) (λ + 1)
.
Step 6. We want to show that the solution constructed satisﬁes all the program con-
straints. The low-type ex post constraint 1− b ≥ (1−p)θ is trivially satisﬁed, when b = pθ.
Because b > θ/2 and 1/2 > (1 − p)θ, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with
the low-type ex ante relaxed IC* constraint. The condition 1 − b = 1 − pθ ≤ θ/2 yields
2− 2pθ ≤ θ, i.e. 1 − θ ≤ 2pθ − 1, i.e. γ = 2pθ−1
1−θ
≥ 1. Hence, for γ ≥ 1, we conclude that
1− b ≤ θ/2. So, after simpliﬁcation, the ex ante high-type IC* constraint becomes:
(1− q) pθ + q
(
(1− pH)θ
2
+ pH
1
2
)
= (1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q
(
(1− pH)θ
2
+ pH
1
2
)
≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pLpθ) + q
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pM
θ
2
)
= (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
which is satisﬁed (with slack when λ ≥ γ/2). The probability constraints are obviously
satisﬁed.
Part 2 (γ < 1). We allow for two cases:
Case 1. I will temporarily consider the following relaxed problem:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2(1− pL) + 2q(1− q)(1− pM) + q2(1− pH)
subject to the low-type and high-type relaxed IC* constraints:
(1− q)
(
(1− pL)θ
2
+ pL
1
2
)
+ q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q)
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pMb
)
+ q
(
(1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH 1
2
)
4
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q
(
(1− pH)θ
2
+ pH
1
2
)
≥
(1− q)pθ + q
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pM(1− b)
)
.
which embed the assumption (to be veriﬁed ex post) that 1−b ≥ θ/2, and to the probability
constraints:
pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH
Step 1. As in the previous case, we conclude that pL = 1.
Step 2. We want to show that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Indeed, if it
does not, we can increase pH without violating neither relaxed IC* constraints (note that
the LHS of the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases in pH).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Suppose not.
We can then reduce b because the LHS of the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases
in b and the RHS decreases in b. This makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack,
without changing pM and pH . But in light of step 2, this cannot minimize the objective
function. Hence, the high-type relaxed IC* constraint must bind.
Step 4. We want to show that for λ < γ/(1 + γ), pH = 0 and pM =
1
(1+γ)(1−λ)
solve
the relaxed problem. The binding relaxed ex ante IC* constraints deﬁne the function:
[pM , b] (pH), after substituting λ for q and γ for p, we obtain:
b =
2λ + γ − θλ− θγ − 2λpH + θλpH − 3λγpH + 2θλγpH − λ2pH − λγ2pH − λ2γpH + θλγ2pH + 1
2 (1− λpH − λγpH) (λ + 1)
pM =
(1− λpH(1 + γ))
(γ + 1) (1− λ) . (6)
Substituting pM into the objective function
W = 2(1− q)(1− pM) + q(1− pH)
duly simpliﬁed in light of step 1, we obtain:
W = pH
λ
1− λ +
2γ − λ− λγ − λ2 − λ2γ
(γ + 1) (λ + 1) (1− λ) ,
because the coeﬃcient of pH is positive, this quantity is minimized by setting pH = 0.
Then, solving for pM and b when pH = 0 we obtain:
b = − 1
2λ + 2
(−2λ− γ + θλ + θγ − 1)
pM =
1
(γ + 1) (1− λ)
5
we know that 1 ≥ γ ≥ λ, so pM ≥ 0, but the condition pM ≤ 1 yields 1(γ+1)(1−λ) − 1 ≤ 0,
i.e. λ ≤ γ
γ+1
, as stated. We note that the probability of war equals:
C =
(
λ− 2γ + λγ + λ2 + λ2γ)λ
(γ + 1) (λ + 1) (λ− 1) .
Step 5. We want to show that for λ < γ/(1 + γ), pH = 0 and pM =
1
(1+γ)(1−λ)
solve the
original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the relaxed
low-type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post constraint b ≥ pθ is
satisﬁed. In fact, simpliﬁcation yields:
b− pθ = 1
2
(λ + 1)−1 (1− γ) (1− θ)λ > 0.
Finally we show that the high-type IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed
high-type IC* constraint, i.e. that 1 − b ≥ θ/2. Note in fact, that this implies that the
ex post constraint 1 − b ≥ (1− p) θ is satisﬁed, because θ/2 > (1− p) θ. Indeed, after
simpliﬁcation, we obtain:
1− b− θ/2 = 1
2
(λ + 1)−1 (1− γ) (1− θ)λ ≥ 0.
Step 6. We want to show that for λ ∈ [γ/(1 + γ),min{1/(1 + γ), γ}], pM = 1, pH =
1 − γ
(1+γ)λ
solves the relaxed problem. When λ > γ/(1 + γ), setting pH = 0 violates the
constraint pM = 1. Further, the expression (6) reveals that pM decreases in pH . Hence
minimization of pH , which induces minimization of W , requires setting pM = 1. Solving for
b and pH , we obtain:
b = −(−λ− 3γ + 2θγ − λγ − γ
2 + θγ2 − 1)
2λ + 2γ + 2λγ + 2
pH =
λ− γ + λγ
(γ + 1)λ
= 1− γ
(1 + γ)λ
.
The condition that pH ≥ 0 requires that λ ≥ γγ+1 as stated.
Step 7. We want to show that for λ ∈ [γ/(1 + γ),min{1/(1 + γ), γ}], pM = 1, pH =
1− γ
(1+γ)λ
solves the original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides
with the relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post
constraint b ≥ pθ is satisﬁed. In fact, simpliﬁcation yields:
b− pθ = 1
2
(γ + 1)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (λ + λγ − 1) (θ − 1) γ
6
and this quantity is positive if and only if λ ≤ 1
γ+1
. Finally we show that the high-type ex
ante IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed high-type ex ante IC* constraint,
i.e. that 1 − b ≥ θ/2. Note in fact, that this implies that the ex post constraint 1 − b ≥
(1− p) θ is satisﬁed, because θ/2 > (1− p) θ. Indeed, after simpliﬁcation, we obtain:
1− b− θ/2 = 1
2
(γ + 1)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (1− θ) (λ− γ + λγ − γ2 + 1)
and λ−γ+λγ−γ2+1 ≥ 0 if and only if λ ≥ 1
γ+1
(γ + γ2 − 1) but because 1
γ+1
(γ + γ2 − 1) <
γ
γ+1
, this condition is less stringent than λ ≥ γ
γ+1
.
Case 2. We want to show that for λ ∈ [1/(1 + γ), γ), pM = 1, pH = 2λ−γλ(2+γ) solve the
original problem. Consider now the same relaxed problem that we considered in the proof
for the case of γ ≥ 1. We know from the analysis for the case γ ≥ 1, that this relaxed
problem is solved by pH = 0, pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
, b = pθ for λ < γ/2 and by pM = 1, pH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+2)
, b = pθ for λ ∈ [γ/2, γ). We now note that
1
γ + 1
− γ/2 = 1
2
(γ + 1)−1 (1− γ) (γ + 2)
and this quantity is positive when γ ≤ 1. Hence the possibility that λ < γ/2 is ruled
out: On the domain 1/(1 + γ) ≤ λ ≤ γ ≤ 1, the solution to the relaxed problem is
pM = 1, pH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+2)
, with b = pθ. We now need to show that this is also the solution
of the original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the
relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint. Consider the ex ante high-type IC* constraint.
The condition 1 − b = 1 − pθ ≥ θ/2 yields γ = 2pθ−1
1−θ
≤ 1. Hence, for γ ≤ 1, we conclude
that 1− b ≥ θ/2, and hence that 1− b ≥ (1− p) θ. So the ex ante high-type IC* constraint
becomes:
(1−q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMpθ)+q
(
(1− pH)θ
2
+ pH
1
2
)
−(1−q)pθ−q
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pM(1− pθ)
)
≥ 0
and indeed, after simpliﬁcation, the LHS equals:
1
2
(γ + 2)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (λ + λγ − 1) (1− θ) γ,
a positive quantity as long as λ+λγ−1, i.e., λ > 1
γ+1
, which is exactly the condition under
which we operate.
This concludes the proof of the characterization lemma. One can then verify by inspec-
tion that the above full characterization determines all the characteristics highlighted in
Proposition 1, but the comparison with no communication, which we now determine.
For γ > 1, λ < γ/2 and λ < γ−1
γ+3
, the separating equilibrium optimal value 1+γ
(1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)2
is evidently larger than the optimal no-communication value 1
(1+λ)2
.
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Suppose that γ > 1, λ < γ/2, and λ > γ−1
γ+3
. The separating equilibrium optimal value
and the no-communication values are, respectively, 1+γ
(1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)2
and 1
λ+1
. The diﬀerence
is:
1 + γ
(1 + γ − 2λ)(1 + λ)2 −
1
λ + 1
=
(2λ + 1− γ)λ
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1)2 ,
and this quantity is positive if and only if λ < γ−1
2
, which is always true for γ > 1 and
λ > γ−1
γ+3
, as γ−1
2
< γ−1
γ+3
requires that γ < 1.
Suppose that γ > 1 and λ > γ/2, and λ > γ−1
γ+3
. The separating equilibrium optimal
value is 1− γλ
(2+γ)(1+λ)
. Taking the diﬀerence with the no-communication value,
1− γλ
(2 + γ)(1 + λ)
− 1
λ + 1
= 2
λ
(γ + 2) (λ + 1)
> 0.
Suppose that γ < 1 and λ < γ/(1 + γ). The separating equilibrium optimal value is
1+γ+λ(1−γ)
(1+γ)(1−λ)(1+λ)2
. Hence,
1 + γ + λ(1− γ)
(1 + γ)(1− λ)(1 + λ)2 −
1
λ + 1
=
(λ− γ + λγ + 1)λ
(γ + 1) (λ + 1)2 (1− λ) ,
because λ < γ < 1, the above is positive if λ− γ + λγ + 1 > 0, i.e. λ > γ−1
γ+1
which always
holds.
Suppose that γ < 1 and λ < γ/(1 + γ). The separating equilibrium optimal value is
1− γλ
(1+γ)(1+λ)2
. Hence,
1− γλ
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2
− 1
λ + 1
=
(λ + λγ + 1)λ
(γ + 1) (λ + 1)2
> 0
Suppose that γ < 1 and λ ∈ [1/(1+γ), γ), so that the separating equilibrium optimal value
is 2(1+λ)+γ
2+γ+λ(2+γ)
and
2(1 + λ) + γ
2 + γ + λ(2 + γ)
− 1
λ + 1
= 2 (γ + 2)−1 (λ + 1)−1 λ > 0.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The Proposition follows from this Lemma.
Lemma 2 Allowing players to play mixed strategies in the unmediated communication
game, the optimal equilibrium is such that the hawk always sends message h and the dove
sends message l with probability σ, where σ < 1 if and only if γ < 1 and
γ
1 + γ
> λ > max
{
−1− γ (5 + 6γ) +
√
(1 + 3γ) (1 + γ (11 + 8γ (3 + 2γ)))
2 (1 + γ) (1 + 3γ)
,
−1− γ (8 + 3γ) +
√
1 + γ (16 + γ (54 + γ (48 + 25γ)))
2 (γ2 − 1)
}
.
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For λ < 2γ2/ (1 + 3γ) ,
pM =
2γ − λ + γλ
2(1 + γ)(γ − λ) , pH = 0, σ = 1 +
λ
2
(1− 1/γ), b = (1 + γ(1− θ))/2
and V =
λ(γ2(4 + 3λ)− λ− 2γλ(3 + 2λ))
4γ(γ − λ)(1 + λ)2 .
For λ > 2γ2/ (1 + 3γ) ,
pM = 1, pH = 0, b = pθ, σ =
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)
(1 + 2γ)
, and V =
γ2
(1 + 2γ)2
.
Proof. We proceed in three parts.
Part 1. (The low type mixes).
The choice variables are b, σ, pL, pM , and pH . We have 19 constraints, i.e. one IC for
the low type which is binding, four IC for the high type to get rid of the maximum in the
constraint, two ex post constraints for high type, four ex post constraints for low type, and
eight probability constraints. First we rearrange the IC constraint for low type and express
b in terms of the other variables. Substituting b into objective function and constraints,
we get rid of b and IC constraint for low type. After simplifying the constraints, we are
left with the following constraints, referred to as constraints Ci, i = 1, . . . , 9. (We omit the
constraints that all probabilities must be in [0, 1].)
1. ICH1 : (1 + γ)pM(1 + λ− 2σ)− (1 + γ)pH(1 + λ− σ) + pLσ;
2. ICH2 : −pH + pM + (pH+pL−2pM )σ1+λ ;
3. ICH3 : (1 + λ)(−γ + λ)pH + (−1 + γ − 2λ)σ(pH − pM) + (pH + pL − 2pM)σ2;
4. ICH4 : (1+λ)(−γ + λ)pH +((−1+ γ− 2λ)pH + γ(pL +λpL − pM) + pM +2λpM)σ+
(pH + pL − 2pM)σ2;
5. EXH1 : pM + pLσ + pH(−1− (2 + γ)λ + σ)− pM(γ − 2λ + 2σ);
6. EXH2 : λ + γ(−1 + σ);
7. EXL1 : pH(1+λ−σ)(1+(2+γ)λ−σ)+σ(pM(2+(3+γ)λ−2σ)+pL(−1−λ+σ));
8. EXL3 : pM(2 + (3 + γ)λ− 2σ) + pLσ + pH(−1− (2 + γ)λ + σ);
9. EXL4 : 1− (1+γ)λ
−1−λ+σ
.
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• case 1: C5 binds
This section covers the case that only C5 binds. We do not assume C5 binds ex ante.
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
pL,pM ,pH ,σ
1− (( σ
1 + λ
)2pL + 2
σ
1 + λ
1 + λ− σ
1 + λ
pM + (
1 + λ− σ
1 + λ
)2pH)
subject to the following constraints:
1. pL ≤ 1,
2. 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1,
3. pH ≥ 0,
4. 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
5. C5 ≥ 0 ⇔ pLσ ≥ (1 + (2 + γ)λ− σ)pH + (γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1)pM .
– Case 1.1: Parameter Region is 1/2<λ ≤ 1
2
(−1 + √5) and 1−λ
λ
< γ < 2λ, or
λ > 1
2
(−1 +√5) and λ < γ < 2λ.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose pL < 1. We can set pL = 1 and
increase pH to make sure C5 is satisﬁed. By doing so, no constraint will be
violated and the objective function is strictly decreased.
2. We want to show that C5 binds. Suppose it does not. We can increase pH
without violating other constraints and decrease the objective function.
3. Suppose (γ−2λ+2σ−1) > 0. Then MCpM
MCpH
= 2σ+(γ−2λ−1)
1+λ−σ+(1+γ)λ
< 2σ
1+λ−σ
= MUpM
MUpH
,
since (γ − 2λ − 1) < 0 and (1 + γ)λ > 0. Therefore, we want pM to be as
large as possible and pH to be as small as possible, i.e. pM = 1 or pH = 0.
If σ ≤ γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1, pH = 0 and pM = σγ−2λ+2σ−1 .
If σ ≥ γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1, pM = 1 and pH = 1−σ+2λ−γ1−σ+2λ+γλ .
4. Suppose (γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1) ≤ 0. We have pLσ + (−γ + 2λ − 2σ + 1)pM ≥
(1 + (2 + γ)λ− γ)pH . Then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH = 1−σ+2λ−γ1−σ+2λ+γλ .
5. To sum up, we conclude that:
(a) If 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 + 2λ − γ, then pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 1−σ+2λ−γ1−σ+2λ+γλ , and
V = γ(1+λ−σ)
2
(1+λ)(1+(2+γ)λ−σ)
.
(b) If 1 ≥ σ ≥ 1 + 2λ − γ, then pL = 1, pH = 0, pM = σγ−2λ+2σ−1 , and
V = − (1+λ−σ)((−1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)+(1+γ)σ)
(1+λ)2(1−γ+2λ−2σ)
.
Under the parameter region we specify above, we know that 1+2λ−γ ≥ 1.
Since σ ≤ 1, only case (a) is possible. And V is minimized when σ = 1.
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6. The solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
2λ−γ
2λ+γλ
, σ = 1,
and V = γλ
2+γ+2λ+γλ
. Substituting these into the original problem, we can
show that all the constraints are satisﬁed. Therefore, this is also the solution
to the original problem.
– Case 1.2: Parameter Region is 0<λ ≤ 1
2
and γ > 1, or λ > 1
2
and γ > 2λ.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH
and decrease the objective function without violating the other constraints.
2. It is easy to show that C5 binds. Suppose not. We can increase pH and
decrease the objective function without violating the other constraints.
3. Suppose (γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1) > 0.
If MCpM
MCpH
= 2σ+(γ−2λ−1)
1+λ−σ+(1+γ)λ
≤ 2σ
1+λ−σ
= MUpM
MUpH
, then we want pM to be as large
as possible and pH to be as small as possible, i.e. pM = 1 or pH = 0. If
σ ≤ γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1, pH = 0 and pM = σγ−2λ+2σ−1 . If σ ≥ γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1,
pM = 1 and pH =
1−σ+2λ−γ
1−σ+2λ+γλ
.
If MCpM
MCpH
= 2σ+(γ−2λ−1)
1+λ−σ+(1+γ)λ
> 2σ
1+λ−σ
= MUpM
MUpH
, we want pM to be as small as
possible and pH to be as large as possible, i.e. pM = 0 and pH =
σ
1+(2+γ)λ−σ
.
4. Suppose (γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1) ≤ 0. We have pLσ + (−γ + 2λ − 2σ + 1)pM ≥
(1 + (2 + γ)λ− γ)pH . Then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH = 1−σ+2λ−γ1−σ+2λ+γλ .
5. To sum up, we conclude that:
(a) If 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1+2λ−γ
2
, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
1−σ+2λ−γ
1−σ+2λ+γλ
, and
V = γ(1+λ−σ)
2
(1+λ)(1+(2+γ)λ−σ)
.
(b) If (−1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)
−1+γ+2γλ
> σ ≥ 1+2λ−γ
2
, pL = 1, pM = 0, pH =
σ
1+(2+γ)λ−σ
.
And V = (1+λ−σ)(1−σ+λ(3+2λ+γ(1+λ+σ)))
(1+λ)2(1+(2+γ)λ−σ)
.
(c) If max(1+2λ−γ
2
, (−1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)
−1+γ+2γλ
) ≤ σ ≤ 1 + 2λ− γ, then pL = 1, pM = 1,
pH =
1−σ+2λ−γ
1−σ+2λ+γλ
, and V = γ(1+λ−σ)
2
(1+λ)(1+(2+γ)λ−σ)
.
(d) If max(1 + 2λ − γ, (−1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)
−1+γ+2γλ
) ≤ σ ≤ 1, pL = 1, pH = 0, pM =
σ
γ−2λ+2σ−1
, and V = − (1+λ−σ)((−1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)+(1+γ)σ)
(1+λ)2(1−γ+2λ−2σ)
.
6. Under the parameter region we specify above, all the cases speciﬁed above
are possible. After comparing all the minimized values, we ﬁnd that case
(d) achieves the minimized V when σ = 1.
7. The solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
, pH = 0, σ = 1,
and V = λ(γ(2+λ)−λ(3+2λ))
(1+γ−2λ)(1+λ)2
. Substituting these into the original problem, we
can show that all the constraints are satisﬁed. Therefore, this is also the
solution to the original problem.
• case 2: C1 binds
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This section covers the case that C1 binds and C5 might bind. We do not assume C1
binds ex ante.
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
pL,pM ,pH ,σ
1− (( σ
1 + λ
)2pL + 2
σ
1 + λ
1 + λ− σ
1 + λ
pM + (
1 + λ− σ
1 + λ
)2pH)
subject to the following constraints:
1. pL ≤ 1,
2. 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1,
3. pH ≥ 0,
4. 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
5. C1 ≥ 0 ⇔ pLσ ≥ (1 + γ)(1 + λ− σ)pH + (1 + γ)(−1− λ + 2σ)pM .
6. C5 ≥ 0 ⇔ pLσ ≥ (1 + (2 + γ)λ− σ)pH + (γ − 2λ + 2σ − 1)pM .
– Case 2.1:
Parameter Region is 0<λ ≤ 1
2
and λ < γ ≤ λ
1−λ
, or 1/2<λ ≤ 1
2
(−1 + √5) and
λ < γ < 1−λ
λ
.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH
and decrease the objective function without violating other constraints.
2. It’s easy to show that either C1 or C5 binds. Suppose both are not bind-
ing. We can increase pH without violating other constraints. Here, we ﬁrst
consider the case where C1 binds.
3. Suppose 2σ−λ−1 ≥ 0. Then MCpM
MCpH
= 2σ−λ−1
1+λ−σ
< 2σ
1+λ−σ
= MUpM
MUpH
. Therefore,
pM = 1 or pH = 0. If σ ≥ (1 + γ)(−1 − λ + 2σ), we have pM = 1 and
pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
≥ 0. If σ ≤ (1 + γ)(−1 − λ + 2σ), we have pH = 0,
pM =
σ
(1+γ)(−1−λ+2σ)
≤ 1.
4. Suppose 2σ−λ− 1 < 0, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, and pH = σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)(1+γ)(1+λ−σ) .
5. To sum up ,we can show that:
(a) If 0 ≤ σ ≤ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
.
(b) If 1 ≥ σ ≥ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, then pL = 1, pH = 0, and pM =
σ
(1+γ)(−1−λ+2σ)
.
6. Since in the parameter region speciﬁed above (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
≥ 1, we know that
only case (a) is possible. Hence, pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
,
and V = γ(1+λ−σ)σ
(1+γ)(1+λ)2
. Notice that V is a quadratic function of σ which is
maximized at σ = 1+λ
2
.
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7. Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint on σ:
γ(−1− 2λ + λ(1 + λ)
1 + λ− σ +
σ
1 + γ
) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
σ1 ≤ σ ≤ σ2,
where
σ1 =
1
2
(2 + γ + 3λ + 2γλ−
√
2γλ(3 + 4λ) + λ(4 + 5λ) + (γ + 2γλ)2),
σ2 =
1
2
(2 + γ + 3λ + 2γλ +
√
2γλ(3 + 4λ) + λ(4 + 5λ) + (γ + 2γλ)2).
Since 1+λ
2
< σ1 ≤ 1 < σ2, we know that V is minimized at σ = 1.
8. Next we consider the case that C5 is binding. Using the same method, we
get the minimized value which is larger than the V speciﬁed above. Hence,
the solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 1− γλ+γλ , σ = 1,
and V = γλ
(1+γ)(1+λ)2
. Substituting the solution to the original problem, we
show that all the constraints are satisﬁed. Hence, this is also the solution
to the original problem.
– Case 2.2: Parameter Region is 0<λ ≤ 1
2
and λ
1−λ
≤ γ ≤ 1.
1. pL=1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH without violating other
constraints.
2. It is easy to show that either C1 or C5 binds. Suppose both are not bind-
ing. We can increase pH without violating other constraints. Here, we ﬁrst
consider the case where C1 binds.
3. Suppose 2σ − λ − 1 ≥ 0, MCpM
MCpH
= 2σ−λ−1
1+λ−σ
< 2σ
1+λ−σ
= MUpM
MUpH
. Therefore,
pM = 1 or pH = 0. If σ ≥ (1 + γ)(−1 − λ + 2σ), we have pM = 1 and
pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
≥ 0. If σ ≤ (1 + γ)(−1 − λ + 2σ), we have pH = 0,
pM =
σ
(1+γ)(−1−λ+2σ)
≤ 1
4. Suppose 2σ−λ− 1 < 0, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, and pH = σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)(1+γ)(1+λ−σ) .
5. To sum up ,we can show that:
(a) If 0 ≤ σ ≤ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
.
(b) If 1 ≥ σ ≥ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, then pL = 1, pH = 0, and pM =
σ
(1+γ)(−1−λ+2σ)
.
6. Since in the parameter region speciﬁed above (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
≤ 1, we know that
both case (a) and (b) are possible.
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(a) If 0 ≤ σ ≤ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
σ+(1+γ)(1+λ−2σ)
(1+γ)(1+λ−σ)
, and
V = γ(1+λ−σ)σ
(1+γ)(1+λ)2
.
Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint:
γ(−1− 2λ + λ(1 + λ)
1 + λ− σ +
σ
1 + γ
) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
σ1 ≤ σ ≤ σ2,
where
σ1 =
1
2
(2 + γ + 3λ + 2γλ−
√
2γλ(3 + 4λ) + λ(4 + 5λ) + (γ + 2γλ)2),
σ2 =
1
2
(2 + γ + 3λ + 2γλ +
√
2γλ(3 + 4λ) + λ(4 + 5λ) + (γ + 2γλ)2).
Taking into account all constraints on σ, we have the following problem:
min
σ
V =
γ(1 + λ− σ)σ
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2
such that
0 ≤ σ ≤ (1 + γ)(1 + λ)
1 + 2γ
= σ3,
σ1 ≤ σ ≤ σ2.
We can show that if γ < 1
4
(3λ−
√
8λ + 9λ2), or γ > 1
4
(3λ+
√
8λ + 9λ2),
then σ3 < σ1 and the feasible region of σ is empty. If
1
4
(3λ−
√
8λ + 9λ2) ≤
γ ≤ 1
4
(3λ +
√
8λ + 9λ2), then 1+λ
2
< σ1 ≤ σ ≤ σ3 ≤ 1. Since
V is a quadratic function of σ, it is obvious that V is minimized at
σ = σ3 =
(1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, and V = γ
2
(1+2γ)2
.
Here we rearrange the parameter region. We show that if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
and 2γ
2
1+3γ
≤ λ ≤ γ
1+γ
, then pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 0, σ =
(1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, and
V = γ
2
(1+2γ)2
.
(b) If 1 ≥ σ ≥ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, we have pL = 1, pH = 0, pM =
σ
(1+γ)(−1−λ+2σ)
, and
V =
(1 + λ− σ)((1 + λ)(1 + λ− σ) + γ(1 + λ− 2σ)(1 + λ + σ))
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2(1 + λ− 2σ) .
Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint:
(−λ + γ(2 + λ− 2σ))σ
(1 + γ)(1 + λ− 2σ) ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to
0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 + λ
2
or
1
2
(2 + λ− λ
γ
) ≤ σ.
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Taking into account all constraints on σ, we have the following reduced
problem:
min
σ
V =
(1 + λ− σ)((1 + λ)(1 + λ− σ) + γ(1 + λ− 2σ)(1 + λ + σ))
(1 + γ)(1 + λ)2(1 + λ− 2σ)
such that
1 ≥ σ ≥ (1 + γ)(1 + λ)
1 + 2γ
,
0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 + λ
2
or
1
2
(2 + λ− λ
γ
) ≤ σ.
If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2γ2
1+3γ
, then 1 ≥ σ ≥ 1
2
(2 + λ − λ
γ
). If γ
1+γ
≥ λ > 2γ2
1+3γ
, then
1 ≥ σ ≥ (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
. Since the curve of V is inverse U-shaped, we know
that the minimal can be achived at σ = 1, σ = 1
2
(2 + λ − λ
γ
), or σ =
(1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
. When σ = 1, V1 =
λ(λ+λ2+γ(−1+λ+λ2))
(1+γ)(−1+λ)(1+λ)2
. When σ = 1
2
(2+λ− λ
γ
),
V2 =
λ(λ+2γλ(3+2λ)−γ2(4+3λ))
4γ(1+λ)2(−γ+λ)
. When σ = (1+γ)(1+λ)
1+2γ
, V3 =
γ2
(1+2γ)2
.
To sum up, we have following three cases:
i. V1 is chosen when 0 < γ < γ
∗ and 0 ≤ λ ≤ −1−2γ
2(1+γ)
+ 1
2
√
1+11γ+24γ2+16γ3
(1+γ)2(1+3γ)
or γ∗ < γ < 1 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ −1−8γ−3γ2
2(−1+γ2)
− 1
2
√
1+16γ+54γ2+48γ3+25γ4
(−1+γ2)2
.
ii. V2 is chosen when γ
∗ < γ < 1 and −1−8γ−3γ
2
2(−1+γ2)
−1
2
√
1+16γ+54γ2+48γ3+25γ4
(−1+γ2)2
<
λ < 2γ
2
1+3γ
.
iii. V3 is chosen when 0 < γ < γ
∗ and −1−2γ
2(1+γ)
+ 1
2
√
1+11γ+24γ2+16γ3
(1+γ)2(1+3γ)
< λ <
γ
1+γ
, or γ∗ < γ < 1 and γ
1+γ
≥ λ > 2γ2
1+3γ
.
Since the solution given in case (b) is superior to that in case (a), the above
solution is the ﬁnal solution.
7. Next we consider the case that C5 is binding. Using the same method, we
get the minimized value which is not smaller than the value for V speciﬁed
above. Substituting the solution to the original problem, we show that all
the constraints are satisﬁed. Hence, this is also the solution to the original
problem.
Part 2 (The high type mixes). Suppose that the high type mix between the high message
(with probability ρ) and the low message. The low type only sends the low message. Let
ζ := q(1−ρ)
1−qρ
be the posterior of facing a high type after the low message. Let π := 1− qρ be
the probability of low message. The optimal equilibrium is found by solving the following
program.
min
b,pL,pM ,pH ,σ
π2 (1− pL) + 2π(1− π) (1− pM) + (1− π)2 (1− pH)
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subject the ex ante IC* constraint for the for the low type:
π((1− pL) (ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ/2) + pL1
2
) + (1− π)((1− pM) (1− p)θ + pM(1− b))
≥ π((1− pM) (ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ
2
) + pM max{b, (ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ
2
)})
+(1− π)((1− pH) (1− p)θ + pH max{1
2
, (1− p)θ})
to the indiﬀerence condition for the high type
π((1− pM) (ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ) + pMb) + (1− π)((1− pH) θ
2
+ pH
1
2
) =
π((1− pL) (ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ) + pL1
2
) + (1− π) ((1− pM) θ
2
+ pM(1− b))
to the high-type ex post constraints:
b ≥ ζθ/2 + (1− ζ)pθ, 1/2 ≥ θ/2, 1/2 ≥ ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ, 1− b ≥ θ
2
to the low-type ex post constraints:
1− b ≥ (1− p) θ, 1/2 ≥ ζ (1− p) θ + (1− ζ) θ/2
and to the probability constraints:
0 ≤ pL ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
But is immediate to note that the constraint set is empty. Indeed, the third high-type ex
post constraint is equivalent to:
−1
2
(1− θ) γ − λ(1− ρ)
1 + λ(1− ρ) ≥ 0,
which cannot be the case for γ > λ.
Part 3 (Both types mix). Suppose that the low type mixes between the low message (with
probability σ) and the high message. The high type mixes between the high message (with
probability ρ) and the low message. Let χ := qρ
1−π
be the posterior of facing a high type
after the high message. Let π := (1− q)σ + q(1− ρ) be the probability of a low message.
Let ζ := q(1−ρ)
π
be the posterior of facing a high type after the low message. The optimal
equilibrium solves the following program:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH ,σ
π2 (1− pL) + 2π(1− π) (1− pM) + (1− π)2 (1− pH)
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subject the ex ante IC* constraint for the for the low type:
π((1− pL) (ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ/2) + pL1
2
) + (1− π)((1− pM) (χ(1− p)θ + (1− χ)θ
2
) + pM(1− b))
= π((1− pM) (ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ/2) + pMb) + (1− π)((1− pH) (χ(1− p)θ + (1− χ)θ
2
) + pH
1
2
)
to the indiﬀerence condition for the high type
π((1− pM) (ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ) + pMb) + (1− π)((1− pH) (χθ
2
+ (1− χ)pθ) + pH 1
2
) =
π((1− pL) (ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ) + pL 1
2
) + (1− π) ((1− pM) (χθ
2
+ (1− χ)pθ) + pM(1− b))
to the high-type ex post constraints:
b ≥ ζθ/2+ (1− ζ)pθ, 1/2 ≥ χθ/2+ (1−χ)pθ, 1
2
≥ ζ θ
2
+ (1− ζ)pθ, 1− b ≥ χθ
2
+ (1−χ)pθ
to the low-type ex post constraints:
1− b ≥ χ (1− p) θ + (1− χ) θ/2, 1/2 ≥ ζ (1− p) θ + (1− ζ) θ/2, b ≥ ζ(1− p)θ + (1− ζ)θ
2
1
2
≥ χ(1− p)θ + (1− χ)θ
2
and to the probability constraints:
0 ≤ pL ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
But is immediate to note that the constraint set is empty. Indeed, second and fourth
high-type ex post constraints are equivalent to:
X :=
1
2
(1− θ) (ρ + σ)λ− γ
ρλ + 1− σ ≥ 0, Z :=
1
2
(1− θ) ρλ− λ + σγ
ρλ− λ− σ ≥ 0.
Evidently, X ≥ 0 requires λ ≥ γ
ρ+σ
, which, in light of γ > λ, requires ρ + σ > 1. Consider
Z, note that it increases in λ. When λ takes its upper value γ,
Z =
1
2
(1− θ) (1− σ − ρ) γ
σ + γ(1− ρ)
which is positive if and only if σ + ρ ≤ 1. This concludes that whenever γ > λ , either
X < 0 or Z < 0 or both.
Appendix B – Mediation
For reasons of clarity, the proof of Proposition 3 is postponed to after the proof of
Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows from this Lemma.
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Lemma 3 The solution of the mediator’s program with enforcement power is such that:
For λ ≤ γ/2,
pM =
1
γ − 2λ + 1 , pH = 0, and V =
(γ + 1)
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1)2 ;
For λ ≥ γ/2,
pM = 1, pH =
2λ− γ
(γ − λ + 1)λ, and V =
γ + 1
(γ − λ + 1) (λ + 1) .
Proof. We ﬁrst solve the following relaxed program:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q2 (1− pH)
subject to high-type ex interim individual rationality:
(1− q) (pMb + (1− pM) pθ) + q
(
pH
1
2
+ (1− pH) θ
2
)
≥ (1− q) pθ + q θ
2
,
to low-type ex interim incentive compatibility:
(1− q)
(
(1− pL)θ
2
+ pL
1
2
)
+ q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q)
(
(1− pM)θ
2
+ pMb
)
+ q
(
(1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH 1
2
)
,
and to
pL ≤ 1, pM ≤ 1 and pH ≥ 0.
First, note that pL = 1 in the solution because pL appears in the constraints only in
the right-hand side of the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility constraint, which is
increasing in pL. Second, note that the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility must
be binding in the relaxed program’s solution, or else one could increase pH thus reducing
the value of the objective function, without violating the high-typeex interim individual
rationality constraint. Third, note that the high-type ex interim individual rationality
constraint must be binding in the relaxed program’s solution, or else one could decrease b
and make the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility slack.
Solving for b and pH as a function of pM in the system deﬁned by the low-type ex
interim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints,
and plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C = −pM γ + 1
(λ + 1) (γ + 1− λ) + K,
where K is an inconsequential constant. Hence, the probability of conﬂict is minimized by
setting pM = 1 whenever possible. Substituting pM = 1, in the expression for pH earlier
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derived, we obtain pH =
2λ−γ
(γ−λ+1)λ
, which is strictly positive for λ ≥ γ/2 and always smaller
than one.
Solving for b and pM as a function of pH in the system deﬁned by the low-type ex
interim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints,
and plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C =
(γ + 1)λ
(γ − 2λ + 1) (λ + 1)pH + K,
where K is another inconsequential constant. The coeﬃcient of pH is positive for λ ≤ γ/2,
hence the probability of conﬂict is minimized by setting pH = 0, which entails pM =
1
γ−2λ+1
,
a quantity positive and smaller than one when λ ≤ γ/2.
The proof of Lemma 3 and hence of Proposition 4 is concluded by showing that this
solution does not violate the high-type ex interim incentive compatibility and low-type ex
interim individual rationality constraints in the complete program.
Indeed, for λ ≥ γ/2, we verify that the slacks of these constraints are, respectively
1
2
(γ − λ + 1)−1 (1− θ) (γ − λ) (γ + 1) > 0,
and
1
2
(γ − λ + 1)−1 (γ + 1) (1− θ) > 0.
Similarly, for λ ≤ γ/2, the slacks are
1
2
(γ − 2λ + 1)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (1− θ) (γ − λ) (γ + 1) > 0,
and
1
2
(γ + 1− 2λ)−1 (λ + 1)−1 (γ + 1) (1− θ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The characterization follows from this Lemma.
Lemma 4 A solution to the mediator’s problem is such that:
• For λ ≤ γ/2,
qL + 2pL = 1, qH = qM = 0, β = pθ, pM =
1
1 + γ − 2λ.
Further,
pL ≤ 2λ
(γ − 2λ + 1) (γ − 1) , if γ ≥ 1, pL ≥
(1− γ)λ
2γ2
(λ− γ) (γ + 2)
(λ− γ − 1) if γ < 1;
The ex ante peace probability is
V =
γ + 1
(1 + γ − 2λ)(1 + λ)2 .
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• For λ ≥ γ/2,
qL + 2pL = 1, pM + qM = 1, β = pθ, qH =
2λ− γ
λ(γ + 1− λ) , qM =
2λ− γ
γ(γ + 1− λ) ,
and qL ≥ λ(2λ−γ)γ2(γ−λ+1) . Further, for γ ≥ 1,
pL ≤ 2 (γ − λ) (γ + 2)λ
(γ − λ + 1) γ (γ − 1) if γ ≥ 1, pL ≥
(1− γ)λ
2γ2
(λ− γ) (γ + 2)
(λ− γ − 1) if γ < 1;
The ex ante peace probability is
V =
γ + 1
(γ − λ + 1) (λ + 1) .
Proof. Consider the general mechanisms subject to the ex post IR and ex interim IC*
constraints (1)-(4). It is straightforward to observe that the ex-post IR constraints con-
straints are stronger than the following (high-type and low-type, respectively) ex-interim
IR constraints ∫ 1
0
bdF (b|h) ≥ Pr[l, h]pθ + Pr[h, h]θ/2,∫ 1
0
bdF (b|l) ≥ Pr[h, l](1− p)θ + Pr[l, l]θ/2, for all b ∈ [0, 1]
and that the ex interim IC* constraint are stronger than the ex interim IC constraint
obtained by substituting the maxima with their ﬁrst argument (the interim payoﬀ induced
by accepting peace recommendations later in the game).
By the revelation principle by Myerson (1979), the optimal ex-ante probability of peace
within the class of mechanisms which satisfy these ex interim IC and IR constraints cannot
be larger than the ex-ante probability of peace identiﬁed in Lemma 3 in Appendix D.
Because the ex interim IC and IR constraints are weaker than the ex interim IC* and ex
post IR constraints, it follows that any mechanism subject to the constraints (1)-(4) cannot
yield a higher ex-ante probability of peace than the one identiﬁed in Lemma 3.
Hence, to prove the result, it is enough to show that the formulas for the choice
variables (β, pL, qL, pM , qM , qH) satisfy the constraints (1)-(4) and achieve the same ex-
ante probability of peace as in Lemma 3. Specialize to the mechanisms described by
(β, pL, qL, pM , qM , qH), the ex-post IR constraints take the following form, for the high
type:
βpM ≥ pMpθ, (qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ,
and for the low type:
pLβ ≥ pLθ/2, (qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− β) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,
(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2 ≥ qqM(1− p)θ + (1− q)qLθ/2,
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whereas the high-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMβ + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ) ≥
max{(qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− β), qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ}+ max{(1− q)pLβ, (1− q)pLpθ}
+max{(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2, qqMθ/2 + (1− q)qLpθ}
+q(1− pM − qM)θ/2 + (1− q)(1− 2pL − qL)pθ,
and the low-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(pM(1− β) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM )(1− p)θ)
+(1− q)(pLβ + pL(1− β) + qL/2 + (1− 2pL − qL)θ
2
) ≥
max{(1− q)pMβ, (1− q)pM θ
2
}+ max{(qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2, qqH(1− p)θ + (1− q)qM θ
2
}
+q(1− qH)(1− p)θ + q(1− pM − qM)θ/2,
It is straightforward to verify that the values provided in Lemma 4 are such that the ex
ante IC* constraint in which the low type does not wage war after misreporting is binding.
Also, plugging in our two sets of values for the choice variables gives the same welfare as
in Proposition 3. We are left with showing that all other constraints are satisﬁed. We
distinguish the two cases.
Step 1. Suppose that λ < γ/2, so that qM = qH = 0. After simpliﬁcation, the low-type
IC* constraint becomes
q(pM(1− pθ) + (1− pM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q) · 1/2 ≥
(1− q)pMpθ + q(1− p)θ + q(1− pM)θ/2,
which is binding for pM =
1
1+γ−2λ
. Consider the high-type IC* constraint
qθ/2 + (1− q)(pMβ + (1− pM)pθ) ≥ max{(qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− β), qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ}
+max{(1− q)pLβ, (1− q)pLpθ}+ max{(1− q)qL · 1/2, (1− q)qLpθ}+ q(1− pM)θ/2,
Note that
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− β) ≤ qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ,
as long as either γ > 1 or pL ≥ (1−γ)λ2γ pM = (1−γ)λ2γ2 (λ−γ)(γ+2)(λ−γ−1) for γ < 1, that
(1− q) pLβ = (1− q) pLpθ
and that
(1− q)qL · 1/2 ≤ (1− q)qLpθ.
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Then we substitute in the high-type IC* constraint (duly simpliﬁed):
qθ/2 + (1− q)(pMβ + (1− pM)pθ) ≥ qθ/2 + (1− q) pθ,
which is clearly satisﬁed because β = pθ.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMβ ≥ pMpθ, and (qqH + (1− q)qM ) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ
are satisﬁed — the second one because both sides equal zero.
We need to show that the low-type ex post constraints are satisﬁed. Indeed:
pLpθ > pLθ/2, (1− q)qL · 1/2 > (1− q)qLθ/2,
whereas
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− pθ) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,
as long as pL (γ − 1) = pL (θ+2pθ−2)(1−θ) ≤ 2 q(1−q)pM = 2λpM . So that if γ ≥ 1, pL ≤ 2λ(γ−2λ+1)(γ−1)
and if γ < 1, pL ≥ 0 ≥ 2λ(γ−2λ+1)(γ−1) .
Finally the probability constraints are satisﬁed. In fact, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1 requires only that
1 ≤ 1 + γ − 2λ, i.e., that λ ≤ γ/2.
Step 2. Suppose that λ ≥ γ/2. Consider the low-type constraint, ﬁrst. After simplifying
maxima, as the low type always accepts the split if exagerating strength, the low-type IC*
constraint is satisﬁed as an equality when plugging in the expressions pM +qM = 1, β = pθ,
qH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+1−λ)
, qM =
2λ−γ
γ(γ+1−λ)
.
Then we consider the high-type IC* constraint. We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst
determine the oﬀ-path behavior of the high type and show that
(qpM + (1− q)pL) · (1− β) ≤ qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ
as long as either γ > 1 or pL ≥ (1−γ)λ2γ p+M = (1−γ)λ2γ2 (λ−γ)(γ+2)(λ−γ−1) for γ < 1, that
(1− q)pLβ = (1− q)pLpθ
and that
(qqM + (1− q)qL) 1/2 ≤ qqMθ/2 + (1− q)qLpθ
as long as qL ≥ 1−θ2pθ−1 q1−qqM , i.e. qL ≥ λγ qM = λ(2λ−γ)γ2(γ−λ+1) .
Then we verify that the consequentially simpliﬁed high-type IC* constraint is satisﬁed
with equality, when substituting in the expressions pM + qM = 1, β = pθ, qH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+1−λ)
,
qM =
2λ−γ
γ(γ+1−λ)
.
We then verify that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMβ ≥ pMpθ, and (qqH + (1− q)qM ) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ
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are satisﬁed with equality when substituting in the expressions for β = pθ, qH =
2λ−γ
λ(γ+1−λ)
,
qM =
2λ−γ
γ(γ+1−λ)
.
Finally, show that the low-type ex post constraints are satisﬁed. In fact
pLpθ > pLθ/2, and (qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2 > qqM(1− p)θ + (1− q)qLθ/2,
whereas
(qpM + (1− q)pL) (1− pθ) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,
as long as pL (γ − 1) = pL (θ+2pθ−2)(1−θ) ≤ 2 q(1−q)pM = 2λpM . So that if γ ≥ 1, pL ≤
2 (γ−λ)(γ+2)λ
(γ−λ+1)γ(γ−1)
and if γ < 1, pL ≥ 0 ≥ 2 (γ−λ)(γ+2)λ(γ−λ+1)γ(γ−1) .
Finally the probability constraints are satisﬁed. In fact, because γ + 1 − λ > 0, 2λ −
γ − λ(γ + 1− λ) = (λ + 1) (λ− γ) < 0, and 2λ− γ − γ(γ + 1− λ) = (γ + 2) (λ− γ) , the
conditions 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ qM ≤ 1 requiree only that 2λ− γ ≥ 0.
Having proved that the claimed solution satisﬁes all constraints, the proof of Lemma 4,
and hence Proposition 3 is now concluded.
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